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INTRODUCTION
Long-term contracts often promise to deliver the seller's full output,
the buyer's requirements, or some variation on these. For example, an
electric utility might enter into a thirty year contract with a coal mine
promising that it will take all the coal needed to supply a particular
generating plant. These open quantity contracts have raised two issues.
The first is whether the promise was illusory. If the utility had no duty
to take any coal, a court could have found that there was no
• Thomas Macioce Professor of Law and Co-director of the Center for Law and
Economic Studies, Columbia University. Oberlin College, 1963; Ph.D. (Economics), Yale
University. I would like to thank the following people for comments on earlier drafts:
Steve Burton, Marvin Chirelstein, Allan Farnsworth, Ron Gilson, Jeff Gordon, Ken Jones,
Avery Katz, Carol Sanger, David Schizer, Alan Schwartz, Robert Scott, Linda Silberman,
and the participants at workshops at the University of Michigan and NYU. Thanks also to
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consideration and, therefore, no contract. While there was a time when
full output and requirements contracts did not fare well on this ground,'
nowadays their validity is rarely challenged with success.
The second and more interesting question today concerns the
interpretation of the quantity term. What, if anything, limits the buyer's
discretion? The answer, both at common law and in UCC §2-306(1), has
been "good faith."3 The Code's Official Comment claims that §2-306
entails "the reading of commercial background and intent into the
language of any agreement. , 4 In fact, it does nothing of the sort. Rather,
it often involves supplanting the parties' careful balancing of various
concerns in the initial contract with a wooden, uninformed reading of
the agreement. With no theory to guide them, courts have held that
good faith required that producers behave in most peculiar ways - for
example, running a plant at below full capacity for the life of the
contract, or running the plant to satisfy the needs of its waste remover
rather than its customers.
This second question is the focus of the present paper, although some
attention will be given to the first as well. The paper is part of a larger
project, the intent of which is to make contract interpretation more
transactionally sensitive.5 It is the most ambitious of the papers thus far,
as it examines a much broader set of cases than had its predecessors.
1 See e.g. Crane v. C. Crane & Co., 105 F. 869 (7th Cir. 1901) (holding contract to
furnish all supplies as may be needed is void for want of mutuality); Bailey v. Austrian, 19
Minn. 535 (1873) (holding defendant's promise to furnish all iron plaintiffs could use did
not create valid contract due to lack of absolute mutuality of engagement). See also Am.
Trading Co. v. Nat'l Fibre & Insulation Co., 111 A. 290, 294-96 (1920) (providing extensive
list of early cases finding contracts void for want of mutuality). For a more inclusive listing,
see L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Mutuality and Enforceability of Contract to Furnish Another With
His Needs, Wants, Desires, Requirements and the Like, of Certain Commodities, 26 A.L.R.2d 1139
(1952); see also Harold C. Havighurst & Sidney M. Berman, Requirements and Output
Contracts, 27 ILL. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1932). For a suggestion that the judicial hostility was
overstated, see Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C.
L. REV. 415, 416 (1988); Stacy A. Silkworth, Quantity Variation in Open Quantity Contracts, 51
U. PrrT. L. REV. 235, 246-251 (1990).
2 For one of the few successful challenges, see Propane Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 429 F. Supp. 214, 218-19 (1977) (discussed infra text accompanying note 47).
U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1998). The UCC already imposes an implied, nonwaivable
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. So, the explicit mention of good faith in §2-306
would seem redundant. It likely reflects the importance of "good faith" in resolving the
illusory promise problem of an earlier era.
' UCC §2-306, Cmt. 1 (1998).
' See Victor P. Goldberg, Bloomer Girl Revisited or How to Frame an Unmade Picture, 1998
Wis. L. REV. 1051 (1998); Victor P. Goldberg, Economic Reasoning and the Framing of Contract
Law: Sale of an Asset of Uncertain Value, 92 REVUE D' ECON. IND. 111 (2000); and Victor P.
Goldberg, In Search of Best Efforts: Reinterpreting Bloor v. Falstaff, 44 ST. LOuIS U. L.J. 1465
(2000).
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Here, the central concern is the allocation of discretion to one party to
respond to changed circumstances and the constraints placed on that
flexibility to protect the counterparty's reliance interest.
Long-term contracts cannot completely specify in advance all the
obligations of both parties over the life of the agreement.' In order to
adapt their relationship to changed circumstances they will find it
necessary to give one, or both, parties the discretion to respond as new
information becomes available. In particular, they might find that
shifting supply and demand conditions would be better met by giving
one party the discretion to vary quantity. Suppose that the party with
discretion is the buyer, as in a requirements contract. The seller would
have two concerns. First, the buyer could use its discretion
opportunistically to rewrite the contract.7 Second, if the seller intended
to make decisions in reliance on the continued performance of the buyer,
it would want a means of conveying the extent of that reliance, perhaps
by setting a minimum quantity or establishing a multi-part pricing
regime.
My thesis is that the courts have used good faith as a blunt instrument
for providing protection to one party's reliance without asking whether
that party would have been willing to pay for such protection in the first
place. In effect, the seller wants to confront the buyer with a price
reflecting the extent of its reliance. If that price is set too high, both
parties lose. It is in their joint interest to fine-tune the protection of the
reliance. And, as we shall see below, they can be quite good at it.
8
A contract grants one party discretion for a reason. The reason might
not always be obvious, and it might not be a very good reason.
However, as in most other areas of contract law, the courts should defer
to the judgment of the parties. If it turns out that the buyer has no
requirements or the seller chooses to produce no output, so be it. Such a
rule would encourage the parties to determine at the time of contracting
how they would constrain the discretion. The invocation of good faith
6 Complex contracts could have more than two parties, but the contracts of concern in
this paper will be two-party contracts.
' See STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIc G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION
BREACH ENFORCEMENT (1995) (noting buyer's discretion to rewrite contract as central
theme). "[1In commercial cases ... discretion in performance may not be used to recapture
opportunities foregone when contracting." Id. at 127.
' The overly generous protection of reliance by invoking good faith parallels the
expansion of liability under §90 of the Restatements. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 2.19. A recent survey of case law suggests that judicial acceptance of reliance
as a basis for enforcing contracts has been overstated. Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the
"New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 CoLum. L.
REV. 580 (1998).
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should be unnecessary or, at worst, it should be read narrowly to
recognize one exception.9 If the contract linked the buyer's requirements
to the needs of a particular plant, sale of the plant or the firm would
terminate the requirements of the buyer, although the plant would
continue to have requirements. The buyer could attempt to avoid the
consequences of a bad bargain by such an opportunistic sale. Even in
these situations, parties can (and do) contract to deal with just such
behavior, so at most the exception serves as a default rule to protect
casual or careless contractors from themselves. Ironically, the UCC does
not preclude this form of opportunism." As we shall see below, the
courts have had difficulty distinguishing the buyer who no longer has
requirements because it had sold its plant from the buyer who had
closed the plant.1
Commentators have converged on the implications of the good faith
standard for open quantity contracts. According to Stacey A. Silkworth,
"[clourts consider two related factors in deciding these cases. First,
courts will uphold quantity variations if they find a valid business
reason that justifies the variation. Second, courts will disallow a quantity
variation and award damages where they find that the quantity
determining party has attempted to manipulate the contract in light of a
contract price and market price disparity."1 2 Similarly, in their treatise
on Contractual Good Faith, Steven J. Burton and Eric G. Andersen state:
' The discretion/reliance problem has traditionally been lumped with two other
classes of cases involving open quantity terms. In some contexts, quantity discretion is, in
effect, an implicit excuse clause. See, e.g., Riegel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d
784, 785-86 (5th Cir. 1975) (involving grower that agreed to sell entire cotton crop before
harvest). Furthermore, the variability might be intended to accommodate the discretion of
a third party. See, e.g. Atlantic Track & Turnout Co. v. Perini Corp., 989 F.2d 541 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding seller acted in good faith when third party terminated project and seller
ended shipments of goods). If bad weather results in a small crop or if the third party
chooses not to go forward, the promisor's obligation is pared back. The second class
involves jobbers who purchase large quantities of goods when the market price exceeds the
contract price. See, e.g., Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory, 132 N.E.
148 (1921) (holding requirements contract for sale of glue invalid due to lack of mutuality).
These cases are analytically different and are beyond the scope of this article.
10 "When an enterprise is sold, the question may arise whether the buyer is bound by
an existing output or requirements contract. That question is outside the scope of this
Article, and is to be determined by other principles of law." UCC § 2-306, Cmt. 4.
u See infra Part III.
12 Silkworth, supra note 1, at 236; see also Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in
Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 997, 1070 (1992) (stating court should compare contract price
with market price); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD., 271, 298 (1992) (stating courts
look at factors such as contract price, market price, and total sales when deciding whether
to complete contract terms).
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"Most cases involving the obligation to perform in good faith can be
synthesized using the following principle: a party performs in bad faith
by using discretion in performance for reasons outside the justified
expectations of the parties arising from their agreement." 13 The problem
with both formulations is that they do not provide a framework for
inferring the valid business reasons (Silkworth) and reasonable
expectations (Burton & Andersen) that would define the contours of
good faith. Indeed, once the analytical framework is understood, it is
clear that "good faith" does no work.
What follows is a tour through the case law with three different
concerns in mind. First is an analysis of the decisions on the merits.
Second, the decisions provide some evidence on how the parties cope
with the problem of harnessing discretion. The evidence, however, is
often not very good, which leads to my third concern: the quality of the
evidence is poor because the courts ask the wrong questions and adduce
the wrong evidence. The exercise will, I hope, provide further support
for framing contract law questions with more attention to the underlying
economics of the transaction. Paradoxically, while I look more deeply at
the economics than the courts have done, the moral of the exercise is that
courts should look even less. With the possible exception of the sale-of-
plant cases, courts should just say, "yes." While elimination of 2-306(1)
is not feasible, modification of the Official Comments could be. I will
propose new Comments that would prevent the courts from sabotaging
the parties' balancing of discretion and reliance.
Section I draws upon my earlier study of petroleum coke contracts 14 to
illustrate the nuanced allocation of discretion regarding quantity
determination. Section II analyzes some cases involving long-term
contracts in which the contract's validity was questioned for want of
mutuality. Sections III and IV analyze contracts in which the
requirements were reduced to zero (or nearly so). The first of these
focuses on the problem of the buyer transferring the underlying asset,
and the second analyzes a set of cases in which the promisor found a
drastic cutback to be the best course of action. Section V concerns
contracts in which an attractive contract price induced the buyer to
increase its requirements (or a seller its output). In Section VI, I present
my proposed set of Official Comments.
'3 BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 7, at 57.
1 Victor P. Goldberg & John Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON. 369 (1987).
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I. QUANTITY VARIATION IN LONG-TERM CONTRACTS: AN ILLUSTRATIVE
EXAMPLE
To facilitate adaptation to changed circumstances, long-term contracts
typically allow one party some discretion regarding quantity -
requirements and output contracts being extreme forms. Even in these,
the discretion will not be unbounded. One limitation on discretion is
physical. A contract, for example, would not require the seller to
provide whatever quantity of widgets the buyer desires. Rather the seller
would commit to providing widgets the buyer needs for a particular
purpose or to supply a particular plant. The capacity of the buyer's plant
would place an outer limit on the buyer's discretion. There are
numerous devices for constraining discretion. The contract could set up
a mechanism, requiring, for example, that both parties ratify changes. Or
it could give one party the power to determine output. If that party
changed the quantity, in a way that would affect adversely the
counterparty, it would be subject to a cost. For example, if Y is the party
with discretion, other things equal, the greater X's reliance, the greater
the price Y must pay for quantity adjustments adversely affecting X. The
law, as currently embodied in §2-306(2), provides a set of default rules
and barriers to surmounting them. The Code exhibits a lack of faith in
the ability of the contracting parties to fine-tune the protection of the
counterparty's reliance. In fact, their ability to fine-tune is quite
impressive, much better, I would assert, than that of courts invoking
good faith after the fact. In this Section, I will illustrate how the reliance-
flexibility tradeoff varies with the context by analyzing quantity
variation in contracts for a particular product during a particular period
- petroleum coke before 1970.'
Petroleum coking is a process that takes the heavy residual oils left
over from the initial distillation of crude oil, producing gas oil (which
can be further processed into lighter, higher valued, fuels like gasoline)
and petroleum coke. In 1970 there were 53 cokers in operation at
refineries in the United States. About 15% of the crude oil refined in the
United States was coked. The coke was a waste product of the refining
process, bulky, and a source of pollution. However, it had some value,
particularly to the aluminum industry. Calcining the coke made it an
excellent conductor of electricity and the calcined coke was used to make
anodes for the electrolytic cell reduction of alumina to aluminum. Its
value in this use was enough so that owners of calciners were willing to
pay the refineries a positive price to remove the coke from their
"s This Section is based on Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 14.
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refinery."
Great Lakes Carbon Corporation (GLC) owned a dozen calciners,
selling the calcined coke to end-users. GLC had storage capacity at ten
different locations, which could hold about an eighteen-month supply of
raw coke. In the late 1950's end-users, primarily aluminum companies,
began building their own calciners. Most, but not all, the aluminum
companies' output was for internal use; some was sold to other end
users. These calciners were, for the most part, built in conjunction with
new cokers.
The contracts between the refineries (cokers) and the calciners varied
considerably in the way they allocated responsibility for the quantity
decision, the variation reflecting the concerns of the parties. For
example, when a refinery added a new coker, it wanted some assurance
that the accumulation of coke would not unreasonably interfere with the
operation of the refinery. But assurance is costly, so the refinery would
have to weigh the benefits of additional assurance against the costs. For
the GLC contracts this weighing generally resulted in granting the coker
complete discretion to produce any quantity of coke (including zero).
However, the results were dramatically different for the end user
contracts.
GLC entered into ten long-term contracts with refineries building new
cokers in 1946-61.17 The cokers' capacity was less than that of GLC's
calciners, which, typically, were supplied by half a dozen or more cokers.
The refineries had little storage capacity, so if the coke were not removed
promptly, the refinery might have to shut down its coking (and perhaps
its refining) operation entirely. GLC, on the other hand, had
considerable storage capacity so that it could immediately remove coke
from the refinery and store it rather than processing it immediately. Its
ample storage capacity enabled GLC to adapt with ease to fluctuations in
the quantity of coke produced at individual refineries. As a result,
almost all the GLC contracts were full output/immediate removal
contracts, with GLC bearing all the risks of quantity variation. The coker
was obligated to sell only if it produced, but the decision as to whether it
should produce (and if so, how much) was entirely in the hands of the
refinery. A failure to remove the coke rapidly enough would constitute a
breach of GLC's obligations.
16 Only high quality (low sulphur) coke was calcined. Low quality (high sulphur) coke
also usually sold at a positive price, albeit a much lower one. It was used primarily for fuel
in utility boilers and cement kilns. See Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 14, at 372.
17 Nine of the 10 were for at least ten years. See Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 14, at
20021
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It is tempting to claim that this allocation of discretion is obvious. The
seller is, in effect, contracting for removal of a waste product, one
accounting for less than three percent of the value of the refinery's
product. Therefore, it seems logical that its production decisions would
be based on the market for its product, not for its waste. Examination of
the contracts with the aluminum companies shows that this is too
simple. The aluminum contracts concerned the simultaneous
construction of a new coker and new calciner. The calciners were located
near the cokers, often sharing the inventory pile. Unlike GLC, the
aluminum companies could not rely on multiple sources (including
inventories) of coke. They were dependent on a particular refinery, just
as the refineries were dependent on them for removing coke. In none of
the contracts did the buyer promise to take all the coker's output. Nor
did the contracts go to the opposite extreme by obligating the cokers to
meet the calciner's requirements. Rather the contracts specified a
minimum quantity, granted the buyer (calciner) some discretion in
varying that quantity (up or down), and provided some mechanism to
convey to the calciner the extent of the coker's reliance. Thus did the
parties fine-tune the protection of their respective reliance interests.
The contracts accomplished this in different ways. In one instance the
buyer agreed to pay a "standby" charge of $75,000 per month, which
obligated it to pay for about 40% of the coke, whether it took any or not.
In effect, if not in name, this amounted to a "take-or-pay" clause." In
other contracts, the price per ton was higher for the first, say, 35% of the
contract quantity than for the remainder. The low marginal price
encouraged the buyer to take more, thereby giving some protection to
the seller's reliance. One contract allowed the buyer to reduce its take if
there were external evidence of a decline in the demand for its
aluminum, the reduction being shared by the parties by formula. The
buyer in that contract did, however, agree to pay 50% of the contract
price whether or not any coke was produced (take-or-pay, again). While
the mechanism varied, the basic format was the same: the calciner
determined the quantity, but the coker's interest was conveyed by
confronting the calciner with a cost if it were to take less than the
contract quantity.
So, although the contracts were all for the same product, petroleum
coke, the allocation of discretion was dictated by the context. Where the
calciners had ample storage capacity, the quantity decision was in the
hands of the cokers (the pure full output contracts). Where calciners had
18 Take-or-pay clauses are misnamed. The buyer agrees to pay for a fixed quantity
regardless of whether he in fact takes it.
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little storage capacity and alternative suppliers were problematic, the
cokers relinquished their discretion, giving the calciner the final say.
However, none of the agreements gave the buyer unbridled discretion
(as would a requirements contract). The calciner's freedom to alter the
quantity taken was typically circumscribed to take into account the
coker's reliance. The negotiated limits on buyer discretion were different
from, and far more nuanced than, those arising from the good faith
standard.
II. MUTUALITY
Economic actors often attempt to arrange their affairs so that there is
no enforceable promise. For example, early automobile franchise
agreements were held unenforceable for want of mutuality. The auto
manufacturers could have redrafted to resolve the technical problem but
chose not to do so because they preferred that their arrangements be
terminable at will.'9 It is important to remember that one, or both,
parties will often desire that their relationship not be treated as an
enforceable contract. However, it is doubtful that constructing the
relationship so that a court would find a lack of mutuality is a sensible
way to achieve that goal.
Mutuality is often invoked strategically by parties who were quite
content to have the contract enforceable at the time of formation, but
were looking for a rationale for not performing when things turned out
not to their liking. Such opportunistic challenges against long-term
contracts on the ground that mutuality is lacking seldom succeed2O
anymore. For an egregious (and venerable) example of a court
validating such an opportunistic ploy, consider Northern Iowa Gas &
Electric Co. v. Incorporated Town of Luverne, Iowa.21 A power company
entered into a twenty-year contract to provide electricity in an amount
"to answer the needs of the town and its said patrons" with the town
having the option to renew for an additional twenty year term. The
town would build, maintain, and own transmission lines from a
connecting point to the town. The contract explicitly recognized the
town's reliance:
19 See Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir.
1940). See also Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1149 (1957) (noting that, for decades, manufacturers successfully drafted
franchise agreements marked by the absence of or indefinite obligations to render the
agreement invalid when challenged by dealers).
20 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at §3.2.
2 257 F. 818 (N.D. Iowa 1919).
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It is further understood that the town is about to expend
approximately $11,000 in order to secure electric lights and power
for its use and for the use of its citizens and patrons, and that it does
and must rely upon the company... to provide such electricity; and
the company therefore agrees that it will furnish the town a good
and sufficient bond in the sum of $5,000, upon which the company
and a solvent surety company shall at all times be liable,
conditioned for the faithful performance of this contract, and for the
payment of any damages, stipulated or otherwise, which the town
may suffer by reason of a breach in whole or in part of any of the
conditions of this agreement. 2
The contract price was 3.5o per kilowatt hour (the opinion is unclear as
to whether this would have been fixed in nominal terms for the entire
forty years). As a result of the First World War, the price was
"confiscatory," and the power company wanted out. It sought an
injunction restraining the town from connecting to its transmission lines.
And the court granted it: "As the [town] under the contract in question
never assumed any obligation on its part, nor agreed to purchase any
definite amount of electricity for lighting or other purposes, the contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant is lacking in mutuality, and
therefore void. "23
The decision is an aberration even in its day. Most courts would have
been capable of overcoming the court's lack-of-mutuality argument.
Surely, the parties thought they had a contract. The court does not say
whether the power company did indeed furnish the $5,000 bond, but it is
reasonable to presume that it did so. According to the court, the power
company furnished a bond against the breach of a non-contract and was
kind enough to grant an option to renew the non-contract. It does not
require a very fertile imagination to find ample consideration in the
town's promise to build and maintain the transmission line; nor should
the uncertain quantity create a problem. Demand projections for
electricity twenty (or forty) years down the road will be highly uncertain,
especially in the early days of electrification. That sort of uncertainty is
precisely why both parties would opt for a variable quantity contract.
The decision provides an illustration both of how a court's framing of
the issue can lead to foolish results (although this court seemed more
intent than necessary on winding up in the wrong place), and of how
parties can tailor their protection of reliance to their needs. The power
company has numerous customers, but the town most likely has only
' Id. at 819.
' Id. at 822.
[Vol. 35:319
Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts
one supplier. The power company could have insisted upon a minimum
payment, but apparently did not do so. The town would have to spend
some money to prepare to receive the electricity and insisted upon some
protection against the seller's failure to meet its needs. The $5,000 bond
seems relatively modest given the initial expenditure, but because the
town would bear the cost of a larger bond indirectly, the magnitude
reflects a judgment as to how much protection its reliance warranted.
In the remainder of this Section, I will discuss three relatively recent
cases in which a disappointed party attempted to avoid a contract by
invoking the lack of mutuality. All three disputes followed fuel price
increases in the early 1970's, although the first, Laclede Gas Company v.
Amoco Oil Company, preceded the October 1973 oil shock.
Laclede was a distributor of natural gas and propane. The developers
of new residential developments would negotiate with Laclede to
provide an assured supply of gas or propane. In the long run, the
efficient fuel would be gas. However, because the capital costs of
connecting to a gas distribution system were likely high and the delays
long, propane served as the interim fuel of choice. Amoco agreed to
supply Laclede with all its propane requirements for specific
developments at a price 4o per gallon above the price posted at Amoco's
refinery. A developer would first request that Laclede supply it. If
Laclede determined that provision would be appropriate, then it could
request that Amoco agree to supply the propane to that development. If
Amoco agreed to do so, it would sign a supplemental form to this effect.
So, Laclede had the responsibility for recommending that a development
be served, but Amoco reserved the right to refuse. Once Amoco had
24 For an older example of when a disappointed party argued lack of mutuality as
grounds for avoiding a contract, see Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Mktg. Co., 243 S.W.2d
823 (Tex. 1951). Portland promised to deliver to Superior "all of the net butane and
propane mixture that it produces." Id. at 826. Superior wanted out of the contract for
reasons unstated. One clause of the contract provided that, although the parties expected
the daily production to exceed 10,000 gallons, Portland would not be in default if it
delivered less than that amount so long as what it delivered was its total production. Id.
Superior argued that because Portland could cease production entirely and thereby avoid
any obligation, the contract was illusory. Id. at 827. Rejecting this argument, the court held
that the implied promise to manufacture and deliver was sufficient to provide mutuality.
Id. The Texas Supreme Court has subsequently held that it was not necessary to rely on the
implied promise to find the existence of a contract "and to the extent Portland Gasoline
found that such an implied obligation was necessary for the contract to be enforceable, we
overrule it." N. Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 603, 608 (1997).
' 385 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. Mo. 1975), affd, 531
F.2d 942 (8th Cir. Mo. 1976). I will consider two other pre-oil shock cases in Section V: City
of Lakeland, Florida v. Union Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 758 (1973); and Orange &Rockland Util., Inc.
v. Amerada Hess Corp., 397 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1977).
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agreed, however, it was obligated to provide the development's propane
requirements.
Laclede was to install, maintain, and operate all distribution facilities
from the point of delivery, Amoco's header piping. It appears from the
court's description that Laclede would have to make some investment in
storage equipment and other facilities in attaching to Amoco's
distribution lines.2 6 Substitution of other suppliers would therefore be
expensive. The Court of Appeals probably overstated Laclede's
vulnerability:
Laclede thus bound itself to buy all its requirements from Amoco by
agreeing to attach its distribution lines to Amoco's header piping;
and even if a change of suppliers could be made under the contract,
Laclede could not own and operate a separate distribution system
hooked up to some other supplier's propane storage tanks without
substantially altering the supply route to its distribution system or
making a very substantial investment in its own storage equipment
and site. As a practical matter, then, Laclede is bound to buy all the
propane it distributes from Amoco in any subdivision to which the
supplemental agreement applies and for which the distribution
system has been established .
The investments could not have been too onerous because they were
meant to be transitional. In the three years the parties operated under
the agreement, seventeen developments signed up, but only eight
remained. (All eight were mobile home parks.) The flexibility afforded
Laclede (discussed below) is another indicator of the modest level of
relation-specific investment. Moreover, while the parties were in
dispute, Laclede began supplying the subdivisions by truck with
26 The trial court suggested that both parties had to make some relation-specific
investments:
It was Amoco's obligation, upon acceptance of a subdivision by this
supplemental letter agreement, to acquire the sites suitable to both parties for the
location of the required storage and vaporization facilities. Amoco was to install,
own, maintain and operate those and any other facilities necessary and 'adequate
to provide a continuous supply' of propane, which included the delivery of
propane into the storage tanks in volumes sufficient to meet the needs of the
customers within the subdivision. Laclede was obliged to acquire easements and
other rights at the installation of its distribution facilities, and to install, own,
maintain and operate said distribution facilities within the subdivision. The title
to the gas would pass from Amoco to Laclede at the outlet of the Amoco header
piping.
Laclede, 385 F. Supp. at 1334.
27 522 F.2d at 38.
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propane from Phillips, procured under a separate supply contract.
2
8
Laclede's contract with Phillips allowed it to buy up to 45 million gallons
of propane annually. The maximum amount of propane it purchased for
the subdivisions was 400,000 gallons, less than 1% of the Phillips'
contract." So, while it could easily meet the demands of the subdivisions
by general purchases of propane and delivering it to its own storage
tanks by truck, the agreement allowed it to save money by putting in
some relation-specific investment and eliminating the costs of truck
distribution.
The agreement allowed Laclede to fine-tune protection for its reliance.
If Amoco accepted a particular subdivision, it was required to meet that
subdivision's propane needs for life. It could not terminate the
agreement. Both parties expected, however, that the systems would
eventually be converted to natural gas. Upon conversion, Laclede would
give Amoco thirty days written notice, which would terminate its
responsibility to the subdivision. In addition, Laclede had the right to
terminate each year, even if the subdivision continued to use propane.-"
Amoco had no right to terminate. Laclede could, therefore, rely on
Amoco's continued supply. However, its right to terminate allowed it to
substitute fuel from an alternate supplier if the contract price so far
exceeded the market price that it would pay to replace Amoco with
trucked-in propane (or to construct alternate distribution facilities for
piped-in propane). Amoco, with a large number of customers and little
relation-specific investment needed no protection and was therefore
willing to forego the right to terminate, especially because the contract
price was indexed to the price it would be charging others (the posted
price).
Nonetheless, a conflict arose when Amoco notified Laclede of a 3o per
gallon increase in April 1973. Laclede objected and demanded an
explanation. Amoco refused to give one, instead sending a letter
informing Laclede that it was terminating the agreement and that it had
385 F. Supp. at 1334.
Id. at 1335.
The agreement stated:
This Agreement shall remain in effect for one (1) year following the first delivery
of gas by (Amoco) to (Laclede) hereunder.... this Agreement shall
automatically continue in effect for additional periods of one (1) year each unless
(Laclede) shall, not less than 30 days prior to the expiration of the initial one (1)
year period or any subsequent one (1) year period, give (Amoco) written notice
of termination.
522 F.2d at 36.
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a right to do so because the agreement lacked mutuality. Whereupon,
Laclede sued, asking for specific performance of the contract.
The trial judge agreed with Amoco. Laclede's right to cancel
arbitrarily, without Amoco having a similar right, made the agreement
void for lack of mutuality. The consideration was "not of sufficient
quality nor quantity to act as a palliative for Amoco to swallow the bitter
pill of Laclede's arbitrary and unbridled right of cancellation." 31 The
Court of Appeals reversed, citing Corbin for the notion that so long as
Laclede could only exercise the power to cancel with notice, the contract
should not be rendered invalid for lack of consideration. The contract
was a requirements contract and such contracts are routinely enforced
where "the needs of the purchaser are reasonably foreseeable and the
time of performance is reasonably limited."
32
The notice rationale, which is widely accepted, is really quite bizarre.
Navigating the somewhat tricky terrain of the doctrine of consideration,
Corbin forwarded this distinction, which is now standard doctrine:
(1) A promises to pay $100 a week for service and B promises to
serve for one year beginning June 1 if he then so pleases. There is
no contract; B's promise is no promise. The same is true if B
promises "I promise to serve for one year beginning June 1, but I
reserve the privilege of not serving."
(2) Is the case materially different if B's promise is, "I promise to
serve for one year beginning June 1, but I reserve the option to
cancel by giving notice before that date"? Both technically and
practically there is a difference, because the terms of B's promise no
longer leave his option unlimited. His option is between serving
and giving notice, and not as in the first case above between serving
and not serving. The cost to B of one of these alternatives - the
giving of notice - may be slight. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of a consideration if agreed upon as such.
The writing and the mailing of a letter is more than a peppercorn.33
So, and the treatises agree, a slight constraint on the promisor's right
to cancel would constitute sufficient legal detriment to provide
consideration.3 In effect, instead of paying $0 for the option (not
31 385 F. Supp. at 1336.
32 522 F.2d at 38.
' Arthur L. Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L. J. 571, 586-587
(1925).
See 522 F. 2d at 37 (citing ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 164, at 83
(1963) and S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 105, at 418-419 (3d ed. 1957). See also
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enforceable), or a nominal amount (perhaps not enforceable because the
payment is a sham),3 the promisor agrees to make a contingent payment
of 34¢ (the price of a postage stamp) to a third party-the Post Office
(enforceable).36 Rather artificial.
The lack of symmetry in the termination mechanism bothered the
district court. Such asymmetries are to be expected and are a natural
consequence of the underlying purpose of the transaction. Discretion
was allocated sequentially. Laclede had the right to propose the
connection of a particular subdivision; Amoco had the right to veto it.
But once Amoco chose not to exercise the veto, the decision on whether
service should continue was put exclusively in Laclede's hands because
Laclede had some relation-specific investment at risk and because
Laclede was responsible for determining when the transition to gas
should be made. The agreement reflects a plausible allocation of
decision rights between the parties. The value both parties anticipated
from entering into the deal stemmed from that carefully structured
allocation of decision rights, not from the irrelevant fact that Laclede had
to give notice.
In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corporation,37 a glitch in the price
index resulted in the contract price of aviation fuel being substantially
below the market price. The contract was a straightforward
requirements contract, in which Gulf agreed to sell all of Eastern's
requirements of jet fuel at specified locations. Eastern had been buying
jet fuel from Gulf under similar contracts for over a decade (and non-jet
fuel for years before that). Indeed, the court suggests that the contract
38was in most respects similar to contracts in general use in the business.
Eastern purchased 100% of its requirements at particular locations, but
only about 10% of its total jet fuel requirements from Gulf under this
contract. The contract price was indexed to a posted price quoted in
Platt's Oilgram, but after the 1973 oil shock, the index failed to track the
market price of oil. Platt's Oilgram reflected the regulated price of
domestic oil, not the unregulated price of foreign oil; by January 1974 the
FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 2.14, n.3.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, §§ 2.11, 3.23.
If the promisor terminates with notice, the damages would be the same as for the $0
option, namely zero. If the promisor neglected to give notice, however, the damages could
be substantial.
415 F. Supp. 429 (1975).
' The court stated: "The contract is Gulf's standard form aviation fuel contract and is
identical in all material particulars with the first contract for jet fuel, dated 1959, between
Eastern and Gulf and, indeed, with aviation fuel contracts antedating the jet age. It is
similar to contracts in general use in the aviation fuel trade. The contract was drafted by
Gulf after substantial arm's length negotiation between the parties." Id. at 432.
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former was $5 per barrel while the latter had soared to $11. The seller
attempted to avoid the consequences by arguing that commercial
impracticability warranted excusing performance, that the contract was
not binding for want of mutuality, and that, even if it were binding, the
buyer had breached the contract by unreasonably varying its demands.
The court rejected all three defenses.
The impracticability issue is beyond the scope of this paper, although
the court was surely right in rejecting the claim. 9 The court had little
trouble with the mutuality defense, noting that the UCC good faith
standard limited Eastern's discretion. Because Eastern could not, in
good faith, cut its requirements to zero, the contract was binding,
although the court did not say why this should matter. And, finally,
Eastern's actual performance under the contract was consistent with the
good faith standard. It did not substantially increase its requirements to
take advantage of the favorable contract price.
The court says little about why the parties (and apparently most other
buyers and sellers of jet fuel) used a requirements contract. The only
reference was to Gulf finding an outlet for jet fuel coming from a newly
completed refinery. That cannot be right. The claim that requirements
contracts were widely used by other refineries and were used by Gulf at
other refineries and at earlier times is inconsistent with this explanation.
More likely, airlines were concerned with maintaining an adequate
inventory at various locations, and refineries were better able to hold
that inventory and adapt to fluctuations in local demand. The contract,
not surprisingly, placed the discretion in the hands of the airlines. The
court provided a catalogue of reasons explaining why fuel liftings at any
particular location might vary either because of external factors or
business decisions by the buyer:
Throughout the history of commercial aviation, including 30 years
of dealing between Gulf and Eastern, airlines' liftings of fuel by
nature have been subject to substantial daily, weekly, monthly and
seasonal variations, as they are affected by weather, schedule
changes, size of aircraft, aircraft load, local airport conditions,
ground time, availability of fueling facilities, whether the flight is on
time or late, passenger convenience, economy and efficiency of
operation, fuel taxes, into-plane fuel service charges, fuel price, and,
ultimately, the judgment of the flight captain as to how much fuel
See Victor P. Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
EcON. 100, 103-104 (1988); Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 527, 542-43 (1985).
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he wants to take.4°
Gulf claimed that Eastern had manipulated its requirements by
engaging in a practice referred to as "fuel freighting." Eastern could
vary its requirements in response to contract versus market price
differentials by filling up at the low-priced airports. Fuel freighting was,
the court argued, an established industry practice, well-known to both
parties. The parties had agreed, in effect, that Eastern would be able to
respond to changed circumstances to economize on its fuel costs. The
court suggested that the opportunities for freighting were very few, but
did not say whether the practical limits on Eastern's discretion were
critical to resolving the breach question. It does not seem to matter to the
court that the opportunities for fuel freighting might be much greater
than in the past three decades because of the unprecedented contract-
market price differential. Of course, if most of the remainder of Eastern's
fuel supply was procured under similar contracts with a similar indexing
failure, there would be little incentive to engage in fuel freighting. The
opinion is silent on that fact..
Despite a huge contract-market price differential, the variation in
quantity appears to have been rather modest. That does not mean that
Eastern did not try to take advantage of the relative price shift; most
likely its response was limited by technological realities. The court relied
upon the practical limits to fuel freighting in finding that Eastern's
behavior was acceptable under the unreasonably disproportionate
standard of UCC §2-306. However, the technological limits on quantity
variation are hardly inevitable. Contracting parties might rationally
choose to allow one party considerable leeway in adapting to relative
price changes, even if that would result in huge swings in
requirements.4 1 The Eastern outcome is surely correct. However, if the
requirements were indeed sensitive to relative prices, then the parties,
not the court, were in the best position to determine whether to interpose
limits on Eastern's discretion.
In Propane Industrial, Inc. v. General Motors Corporation,42 the court
actually found a contract void for want of mutuality when the buyer's
requirements were very sensitive to relative prices (up to a quantity
ceiling). General Motors' assembly plant in Kansas City used natural gas
for heating during the winter. However, it had an interruptible contract
with the public utility, the Gas Service Company. In such a contract, the
I Eastern, 415 F. Supp. at 436.
4 See infra Part VII.
42 429 F. Supp. 214 (1977).
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buyer gets a reduced unit price, but agrees that the utility can interrupt
supply from time to time. This variable quantity contract (not the subject
of the dispute) allows the utility to adjust to demand surges and
temporary supply shortages by allocating the risks to a particular subset
of customers. General Motors was willing to accept the risk of supply
interruptions because it maintained a standby supply of propane gas at
the plant. It contracted with various propane companies to assure
supplies of the standby propane. The disputed contract was with one of
these suppliers and covered the 1973-74 heating season. In the previous
year there had been three suppliers (including Propane Industrial (PI));
in 1973-74 there were two.
The PI contract was on a General Motors purchase order. General
Motors agreed to pay 17¢ per gallon for up to 500,000 gallons:
To cover a possible requirement of (500,000) gallons of propane to
be used as standby fuel at this Plant during the Heating Season from
September 1, 1973 through April 30, 1974.... By the acceptance and
acknowledgment of this Purchase Order, Vendor guarantees
standby propane availability of the above quantity during the
heating season to be delivered in accordance with [maximum
deliveries for month, week, and day]. 43
This was the backup standby contract for most of the period. General
Motors's other contract was with Enterprise Products Company for
propane requirements from November 1, 1973 through March 31, 1974.
General Motors agreed to "purchase 1,600,000 gallons at $0.15463 per
gallon, with an option to be relieved of the obligation to purchase by
payment of $0.035 per gallon or to delay delivery until the 1974-1975
heating season by payment of an additional $0.045 per gallon, plus
freight charges." 44 Thus, if General Motors took less than the contract
quantity, Enterprise would be paid 3.5o per gallon and an extra penny if
General Motors carried the obligation over to the next heating season. PI
would be paid nothing for standing ready to deliver propane on 24-hour
notice.
So, PI was to be the exclusive supplier for the cusp months and
Enterprise the primary supplier in the peak months. The PI contract did
not, however, state how many firms might be standby providers.
Conceivably, after receipt of the PI purchase order, General Motors could
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It is important to recognize, as the court did not, that the contract in
dispute was only one piece of 'a larger package. General Motors wanted
an assured supply of fuel for heating for the winter months. It could
have obtained all its fuel from a single supplier - the gas company - if
it were willing to pay the price. But it could do better by patching
together a set of flexible agreements, which assured it a lower net price.
The primary contract with the gas company gave the seller the discretion
to cut off supplies under certain conditions. Its secondary contract with
Enterprise was for a fixed quantity. However, General Motors could
reduce the quantity if it wanted to and was willing to pay a per unit fee.
In effect, it promised to pay a flat fee (3.5 cents per gallon) for the option
to take up to 1.6 million gallons of propane in the peak months at a fixed
price of roughly 12 4 and had the option to pay an additional penny per
gallon to carry over untaken propane to the next heating season. This
could be re-characterized as a take-or-pay contract with a make-up
clause in which General Motors agreed to pay for about 22% of the
contract amount, regardless of whether or not it took anything. The
tertiary contract with PI provided additional assurance at a price
premium, but gave General Motors complete discretion as to whether it
would use PI's propane or someone else's. General Motors did not
foreclose its ability to search for lower prices; if the market price had
fallen, General Motors could have gone elsewhere or insisted that PI
revise the agreement.
It could have achieved almost the same results by promising that it
would buy propane from PI and Enterprise only and by giving PI a right
of first refusal vis a vis other potential propane suppliers. Such an
arrangement would likely be less attractive to General Motors because
the first refusal right discourages outsiders from bidding and would
limit General Motors's flexibility by forcing subsequent bids into the
same form as the PI agreement. For example, General Motors might be
willing to entertain an offer to supply propane for September only, but
that would be precluded by a first refusal clause. The arrangement also
gave it the flexibility to respond to a price increase. If circumstances
changed, so that it appeared that prices would be higher in the following
heating year, General Motors could increase its take of the PI propane up
to the ceiling and roll the Enterprise propane over to the next year.
Propane prices began rising in mid-1973 and PI wrote that it would be
unable to fulfill the contract unless the price were increased. The dispute
is complicated by the fact that the federal government instituted a
This is the incremental price, the full price of about 15.5c less the 3.5c fixed payment.
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mandatory Propane Allocation Program in October 1973. At the request
of the Federal Energy Administration, PI delivered 75,000 gallons to
General Motors's Fairfax plant at the very end of 1973. General Motors
paid at the contract price of 17€. PI billed at 40.5o per gallon 46 and sued
for the difference. If the delivery had been made under an existing
contract, General Motors would win; if not, then the federal statute
provided that the price must be a reasonable price at the time of delivery.
General Motors conceded that the price billed by the plaintiff would be
reasonable.
The question, according to the court, was whether the buyer had
promised to purchase exclusively from the seller. The court concluded
that it had not:
Plaintiff could not expect defendant to purchase any propane from
it during the 1973-1974 season if defendant obtained more favorable
terms under purchase orders with other suppliers. Stated
conversely, the plaintiff could not have enforced against defendant
an obligation to purchase from plaintiff all propane required by
defendant at its Fairfax plant during the 1973-1974 season.
Therefore, it is concluded that defendant made no express or
implied promise to purchase any propane from plaintiff during the
1973-1974 season. In the absence of such a promise, [the] purchase
order.., lacks the mutuality of obligations and consideration
required for a binding requirements contract because defendant
gave no consideration and incurred no legal detriment in exchange
for the promise of plaintiff. The purchase order constituted merely
an offer or invitation for orders, which could be revoked by plaintiff
at any time prior to accegtance by receipt of an order for a specific
amount from defendant.
If the question posed by the court were the proper one, then its answer
is surely correct. General Motors had not bound itself to do anything at
all. It could take its propane requirements from Enterprise or anybody
else and not breach its promise. But, so what? PI had granted General
Motors an option at a price of zero. This was not a gift. PI did it because
doing so was valuable, ex ante. Having a standby supply contract in
place meant that there was a reasonable probability that it would sell
propane to General Motors. The contract price appeared to reflect the
risks of holding inventory, because it was 10% higher than Enterprise's
The weighted cost of the propane to it was about 35o.
" Propane Industrial, 429 F. Supp. at 221.
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full price and 40% over its incremental price. There was a bargain and
each side received a benefit. That General Motors's discretion on the
downside was unbounded should be irrelevant. The deal was valuable
to PI, at least ex ante, not because of General Motors's good faith, but
because of General Motors's self-interest.
The Propane Industrial decision is one of the rare modem cases in
which the lack-of-mutuality defense has succeeded. The more significant
cases today concern the interpretation of variable quantity agreements.
The case law has distinguished between cases in which there has been a
significant decrease in requirements and those in which there has been a
significant increase. In the former category, it has lumped together cases
in which a firm ceased to have requirements because it shut down a
facility and those in which it ceased to have requirements because it sold
the facility to someone else who continued to operate it. In the following
Section, I begin the discussion of the interpretation issue by
disaggregating the former category.
III. ZERO REQUIREMENTS BECAUSE OF TRANSFER
If the buyer in a requirements contract has no requirements, it should,
the UCC notwithstanding, not be liable and an inquiry into the buyer's
good faith should be irrelevant. There is one plausible exception to this
rule. The basic problem is simple enough. X agrees to provide Y's
requirements at a particular plant. Y then sells, leases, or otherwise
disposes of the plant to Z who continues to run the plant. Y claims to
have no requirements and Z says it is not bound by Y's contract.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century both English and
American courts allowed that a requirements contract could be undone
by a change of control. In Drake v. Vorse,4 the defendant in a
requirements contract ceased doing business as an individual and
entered into a partnership. The court held that he was under no
obligation as an individual to take any more castings because he needed
none for his business as an individual. Nor did the partnership have an
obligation to take because it was not a party to the contract. 49 Similarly,
3 N.W. 465 (1879). For a more recent case holding that if a contract did not preclude
the buyer from selling his business, then the sale would effectively eliminate his duty to
have requirements, see Langenberg v. Guy, 77 Cal. App. 664 (1926).
'9 The court noted:
But, conceding that it [the contract] bound him [the defendant] to order and take
of the plaintiff all the castings he should want, it could not, we think, have the
effect to preclude him from entering into a partnership, nor would it become
obligatory upon the firm. It was certainly the defendant's privilege to
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in Rhodes v. Forwood,s Lord Cairns noted that a buyer could take zero
requirements if the principal's colliery closed on account of low prices,
strikes, etc.:
.. if... it could not be contended that there is any provision in this
contract against any of those risks, why is it to be assumed with
regard to the... risk of the colliery owner, not selling his coal
elsewhere piecemeal but selling the colliery itself to a purchaser,
that there is an implied undertaking against that one risk, although
it is admitted that there is no undertaking at all against any of the
other risks?... The simple point here appears to me to be, as it is
admitted that there is no express contract which has been violated,
can your Lordships say that there is any implied contract which has
been violated? I can find none. I cannot find any implied contract
that the colliery owner would not sell his colliery entire.5'
An ALR annotation circa 1920 suggested that the application of the
rule was symmetrical: ".... where the buyer disposes of the business
with reference to which he has purchased a commodity to the extent of
his requirements, the seller is under no obligation to furnish such
commodity to the purchaser of the business, nor is he under any
obligation to furnish the same to the original buyer.",
2
These decisions can be contrasted with another nineteenth century
case, Wells v. Alexandre. 3 There, the seller agreed to furnish all the
buyer's coal requirements for three steamships for one year. It did so for
six months, whereupon the buyer sold the steamships, which continued
to ply the same route for the remainder of the year. The new owners
apparently purchased their coal elsewhere (the decision is vague on this)
and the coal supplier sued the original owner.54 The court held for the
discontinue business at any time when it should appear to him that his interest
demanded it, and that, too, without becoming liable to the plaintiff in damages.
He did discontinue business upon his individual account. After that he did not
individually want or need any castings, and as the firm was not bound to take
any we do not think that the defendant became liable.
Drake, 3 N.W. at 467.
- 47 L.J.Q.B. 396 (1898).
51 Id. at 401; see also Hamlyn & Co. v. Wood & Co., 2 Q. B. 488 (1891). In Hamlyn,
defendant, a brewer, agreed to sell all the grain that was a waste product of the brewing
process for ten years. It sold the business to another brewer who refused to adopt the
contract. The court refused to recognize an implied term that the defendant would not sell
the business for the life of the contract. Id.
52 7 A.L.R. 498, 507 (1920).
29 N.E. 142 (1891).
The opinion is silent on whether they could, or did, sue the new owners.
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plaintiff:
The fact that the defendants deemed it best to sell the steamers
cannot be permitted to operate to relieve them from the obligation
to take the coal which the ordinary and accustomed use of the
steamers required, for the provisions of the agreement do not admit
of a construction that it was to terminate in the event of a sale or
other disposition of them by the defendants.55
In effect, the court hints at what appears to be a sensible default rule:
transfer of property does not terminate the obligation.. Whether that
really is an appropriate rule has nothing to do with variable quantity
contract questions. In any event, as we shall see, parties can, and do,
contract on this question. The significant point is that one can easily
distinguish between the buyer who has no requirements because it had
transferred the business to a successor (which does still have
requirements) and the buyer who simply closes down its plant.
The courts took a wrong turn in Diamond Alkali v. P.C. Tomson.
Diamond was an Ohio manufacturer of soda ash, caustic soda and other
related products, which were used by Tomson in its Philadelphia
factory. The parties decided that it would make sense to relocate
Tomson's factory adjacent to Diamond's. Diamond loaned Tomson
$100,000 and sold it the land for the factory. Tomson agreed to build a
plant on the site capable of taking care of its entire present business.
The plant was to cost not less than $100,000. Diamond agreed to sell
Tomson all of its requirements for five years. Tomson's president
testified as to its reliance on the agreement:
I think the reason for fixing a period of five years during which the
Diamond Alkali Company would furnish us with our requirements,
was that if we only made a yearly agreement, we would invest in a
factory there, and have several hundred thousand dollars invested
in it, and if anything should happen, we couldn't get our raw
material, why, there would be no advantage to it. I think that was
one of the reasons for it. We wanted to be sure of the supply for our
manufacturing during the period of five years operating our new
building. 7
The seller also relied on the contract, expanding its capacity after
entering into the contract.
Wells, 29 N.E. at 143.
35 F.2d 117 (1929).
Id. at 119.
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Tomson erected the plant in Ohio, but before it had moved its
operations to Ohio, it sold its Philadelphia plant, including good will, to
a third party and agreed not to enter into the business again for five
years. It then refused to open and operate the Ohio plant. Hence, the
requirements at the plant were zero. Diamond sued for equitable relief,
which the court denied. The Court of Appeals concluded that Tomson
had breached the contract and the case was remanded to determine
damages.
The agreement explicitly stated that Tomson was "not to sell, lease or
enter into any contract for the operation of its manufacturing plant at
Fairport without the consent of the Alkali Company during the
continuance of this agreement."58 This term would almost certainly have
prevented someone from operating the Ohio plant without using
Diamond's products. The harder question is what to do in the situation
in which the new factory is abandoned. The court does not tell us why
the sale price of the Philadelphia facility was so attractive that the parties
would be willing to turn their back on a brand new facility that had cost
over $100,000 (in pre-Depression dollars) to build. It must have been a
heck of a deal. The court, citing Wells v. Alexandre, held that the mutual
intentions of the parties were that they would continue in business for
five years and that Tomson, by accepting the covenant not to compete,
had breached this contract.
It seems odd that a third party would offer to pay Tomson enough so
that in effect it would be dynamiting its expensive new factory. I suspect
that this was not the case and that the court, confused by its framing of
the matter, left out a significant piece of the story. It is silent on whether
anything in the contract with the third party precluded Tomson's sale of
the new plant to either Diamond or another firm. Because it is likely that
such a deal would be a Pareto improvement over demolition of the new
factory, one suspects that resale was the likely outcome. Had it sold to
another (with Diamond's approval), the requirements contract should
remain alive; had it sold to Diamond, the contract would be moot. The
court's resolution was probably not the final step. It most likely merely
defined the starting point for bargaining over the disposition of the new
plant.
That is all speculation on my part. The significant points are two.
First, there is a huge distinction between the case in which the
requirements of the physical facility cease and the case in which the
buyer transfers ownership of the facility, but the facility continues in
Id. at 118.
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operation. Second, the contract gave Tomson the discretion to adapt to
changed circumstances; had Diamond wanted more protection of its
reliance, it could have insisted upon minimum payments (for example, a
take-or-pay provision). It chose not to because it believed that Tomson's
self-interest provided adequate protection for its reliance. The likelihood
was very low that Tomson would find that the most profitable use of a
brand new factory would be to close it. There is no reason to rewrite that
contract to give Diamond more protection than it had bargained for.5 9
The issues in Diamond Alkali were somewhat obscured by the lack of
information regarding the future use of the new plant. Central States
Power & Light v. United States Zinc Co.,60 which concerned a three-year
contract supplying natural gas to a smelter, presented a simpler problem.
The gas supplier would have to construct a pipeline to the smelter; it
appears from the decision that the costs of that pipeline would be
covered by the expected future gas sales. The smelter required about 6.5
million cubic feet of gas per day. The contract called for a fixed quantity
of 3 million cubic feet. However, if the buyer's total requirements did
not reach 3 million, its obligation would be capped by its total•61
requirements. The buyer had no obligation to resell (or store) gas it
could not use. If it operated at more than 50% capacity, it either had to
find other suppliers or buy gas from Central States at a price (and other
terms) to be negotiated.
Nine months after signing the contract, the buyer, after failing to
renegotiate a more favorable price, dismantled the plant and
discontinued its operation. The gas supplier sued, claiming that the
buyer had implicitly promised to stay in business and to continue to
have requirements. The majority, relying in part on Wells and Diamond
Alkali, agreed. The buyer "owning an established business had the
implied obligation to continue it in the usual manner, and accept during
' The district court (which had found for Tomson) had asked rhetorically: "How can it
be found that the defendant had in mind and may be assumed to have agreed to continue a
losing business for a term of five years or to forego an advantageous sale?" Diamond
Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson & Co., 23 F.2d 515, 516 (1928). It also noted that the agreement
had placed a number of restrictions on Tomson: "the defendant shall neither mortgage nor
in any manner pledge its assets without the consent of the plaintiff. Why was not a sale
included, if contemplated?" Id.
60 F.2d 832 (1932).
61 "Vendee agrees to receive, purchase and pay for said gas at said price and on the
basis above stated, and to take during the first year of the contract at least two million cubic
feet of gas per day, and during the second and third year of the contract at least three
million cubic feet of gas per day; provided, that, if the total requirements of vendee for gas
fuel does not equal or exceed the two or three million per day that vendee shall be required
to take only the amount of its total requirements." Id. at 832.
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the time fixed the gas required to so conduct it." 62 The court in effect
took a contract in which the parties had limited the buyer's discretion in
a way that protected it from having to be a reseller of gas it could not
use, to a take-or-pay contract in which the buyer promised to pay
whether it took the gas or not. The dissent highlighted the distinction
between this case and Wells:
I think the [buyer] was entitled to a directed verdict. The parties
agreed upon a partial supply of gas needed for a particular smelter
described in the contract. If that smelter burned any gas, appellee
must purchase it of appellant, up to the specified amount. That is a
fair and valid contract. Vendee could not escape its obligation by
selling the smelter; as long as the smelter required gas, the
obligation remained. But does the obligation remain if the smelter is
destroyed by fire, or is razed by a tornado, or is dismantled because
of the collapse of business? In such events, no gas is required for
the smelter, and there was no agreement to buy gas not required. It
matters not whether the dismantling occurred in a year, or a month,
or a day. That is the contract the parties made.63
Texas Indust. v. R. P. Brown et al.,4 a simple variation on Wells, involved
a requirements contract for "aggregate" (an input into the manufacture
of concrete masonry units) to supply three of the buyer's plants. The
seller built a new plant at a cost of $500,000 to serve the three plants. The
buyer then leased its plants to a group of lessees and thereafter argued
that the leasing arrangement extinguished the contractual obligation,
despite the fact that the plants continued to operate and to have
requirements. The court held for the seller, but lumped this case with
others in which the plant's requirements were zero (as in the previous
two cases).
In these circumstances, the law of Texas imposes an implied
obligation upon the buyers to keep the plants in operation lest, by
disposing of them or shutting them down, the buyers be permitted
to destroy the subject matter of the contract, the requirements of the
plants, in violation of the intention of the parties that sales and
purchases under it would continue for the full term thereof. This
rule was recognized in a decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in
1951, Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., Inc., 150 Tex.
533, 243 S.W.2d 823,825, wherein was cited Williston on Contracts,
62 Id. at 834.
6 Id. at 836.
218 F.2d 510 (1955).
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Rev.Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 357-358, which refers to a class of cases that
finds from the business situation, from the conduct of the parties,
and from the startlingly disproportionate burden cast upon one of
them, a promise implied in fact by the seller to continue in good
faith sales or production, or on the part of the buyer to maintain his
business or plant as a going concern, and to take its bona fide
requirements. 'In other words, this view implies an obligation to
carry out the contract in the way anticipated, and not for purposes
of speculation to the injury of the other party.' 6s
The agreement itself made clear that it would not terminate because of
sale, assignment, and so forth.& The buyer invoked the contract
language, apparently because leasing was not specifically mentioned.
The court, however, rejected this argument, holding that the language
made it clear "that the contracting parties took pains to anticipate and
provide against contingencies such as are now being put forward as
reasons for terminating the contract."6 7  That should have been the
dispositive issue - did the contract survive the substitution of parties.
Invocation of good faith and disproportionate burdens is quite beside the
point.
Tri-state Generation & Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Shoshone River Power,
Inc.6 illustrates how a party might opportunistically sell its business in
an effort to get out from under an onerous requirements contract. Tri-
state, a generation and transmission (G&T) cooperative, provided
electricity to 25 distribution cooperatives including Shoshone. Part of
Tri-state's financing came from the Rural Electrification Administration
(the REA), which required as a condition of its loans that its G&T
borrowers get requirements contracts of matching maturity. Shoshone's
' Id. at 512-13.
The agreement stated:
Nothing in this agreement contained shall prevent any party hereto from
consolidating or merging its operation into another operation, or from changing
the form of organization, or from selling, conveying, or exchanging its property
as an entirety or substantially as an entirety, but any and all such mergers,
consolidations, organizational changes, sales, conveyances, or exchanges shall be
binding upon the organization resulting from or succeeding to the ownership of
the property as an entirety or substantially as an entirety, to the intent that the
terms and provisions of this contract shall inure to the benefit of and be binding
upon the parties hereto, and upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors
and assigns of each party hereto.
Id. at 513.
67 Id. at 513.
874 F.2d 1346 (1989).
20021
University of California, Davis
original contract was of 33 years duration, and the most recent
modification had extended the life to 43 years. The requirements
contracts between Tri-state and its member distribution cooperatives
were meant to be security for the loans. However, there was no
minimum payment. Shoshone had over 1,000 members to whom it
supplied electricity. The arrangement worked fine for decades, but in
the mid-1980's when fuel prices collapsed, Tri-state's prices remained
high. Pacific Power & Light Company offered to supply Shoshone and
other distribution cooperatives at prices substantially below Tri-state's.69
To take advantage of Pacific's low prices, Shoshone agreed to sell to
Pacific its assets, which consisted of the power-delivery subscriptions of
its members and, to a lesser extent, its poles and power lines. That is,
Shoshone's members would continue to have electricity requirements,
but these would be supplied by Pacific, not Tri-state
Tri-state attempted to enjoin the asset sale. The court denied specific
performance, but found that Shoshone's action was a breach of the
contract and awarded damages. The majority held that "as a matter of
law,... when there are sufficient members in Shoshone's system
requiring electric power, a sale of Shoshone's assets or member
subscriptions to Pacific cannot qualify as a good faith reduction or
elimination of requirements." 70  The dissent, which would have
remanded for a new trial on liability, noted that the seller could have
achieved greater protection of its reliance by including a take-or-pay
clause in the contract. It also remarked on the lack of provisions
preventing the sale of the business or making the contract binding on the
buyer's successors or assigns. In effect, the court came up with a
plausible default rule - the requirements are defined by the physical
assets, not by the identity of the contracting party. The moral is blurred,
however, by a convoluted opinion, which relies extensively on Diamond
Alkali and Central States, failing to recognize that in both these cases the
facilities would not remain in operation.
For a decision suggesting that the default rule be that the agreement
should survive the sale of the asset, see Proctor v. Union Coal Co.71 In that
case, the court states, "The construction [of the contract] that the
defendant could terminate the plaintiff's rights at any time by a sale of
the premises, would leave the plaintiff wholly at the mercy [of the
defendant].... It is not to be presumed that the parties intended so
6 Tri-State Generation & Transmission Assoc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d
351,353 (1986).
70 Tri-State, 874 F.2d at 1360.
- 137 N.E. 659 (1923).
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unreasonable an agreement, in the absence of language expressing such
intention." 72 I am not insisting that this default rule is the right one. So
long as the barriers to contracting around this default rule are low, it
should not much matter. My point is that the cases in which the party
sells the underlying asset are analytically different from those in which
the party closes down the plant or drastically reduces its requirements.
Those cases are the subject of the next Section.
IV. REDUCED REQUIREMENTS
Most commentators agree that the law, both pre- and post-Code,
treated increases and decreases asymmetrically. 73 A dispute continues
over whether the "unreasonably disproportionate" language of the UCC
applies on the down side; the 1999 revised draft of the UCC suggested
that the drafters desired symmetry.74 The preference for asymmetric
treatment stems from the recognition that there is less opportunity for
the quantity-determining party to take advantage of price variations by
decreasing its requirements. A requirements buyer could increase its
purchases without limit (if the contract placed no limit) to take
advantage of a rising market, but it could only cut its requirements to
zero to take advantage of a market price decline.
The Code puts considerable emphasis on the role of quantity estimates
and prior dealings between the parties in imposing extra-contractual
limits on the quantity-determining party's discretion. Even under the
Code, however, a buyer could, in "good faith" substantially cut back, or
even eliminate, its requirements. But "good faith" is interpreted, heaven
knows why, to mean that the firm can shut down for lack of orders, but
not to curtail losses.75 In effect, the Code interpretation implies a take-or-
pay obligation with that obligation determined ex post by the court as a
matter of fact. No attempt is made to relate the standard to any
economic context. Why would businesses want this default rule,
Id. at 660.
See Silkworth, supra note 1, at 235-36 (suggesting case law does not distinguish
between increase and decrease cases, nor should it).
7' "The question is whether the lack of output or requirements occurred in good faith,
not whether the lack of actual output or requirements was 'unreasonably disproportionate.'
This follows the interpretation of prior 2-306(1) in Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co.,
840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988), but rejects the court's dictum that the unreasonably
disproportionate limitation is not applicable to any decrease in quantity or requirements."
U.C.C. § 2-304, Cmt. 4 (Proposed Final Draft May 1, 1999). The most recent draft of the
Code omits this comment. Both Easterbrook and Posner accept the asymmetric
interpretation. See infra discussion below at notes 80-88 and 111-131.
UCC § 2-304, Cmt. 2.
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especially if it is difficult to contract around? A simpler starting point
would be a default rule which gives complete flexibility on the down
side with the only concern being avoidance by change of title (as
discussed in the previous section).
In this Section, I will consider seven quantity-reduction cases. In the
first two, the court upheld the reduction, although the last decision was
most likely incorrect. In the next three, the court invoked good faith to
undo a perfectly sensible allocation of discretion. I then analyze Empire
Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co.,76 in which a watered down version of
the good faith standard is still potent enough to subject a buyer to
millions of dollars in damages for a failure to have any requirements. I
conclude with a brief description of a recent decision, which illustrates
the futility of relying on a good faith standard absent a coherent
framework for understanding the transaction.
The case cited in the UCC comments for the proposition that a firm
can drastically reduce its requirements in good faith is Southwest Natural
Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. A cement company had a
fifteen-year requirements contract for provision of all its natural gas
needs. It subsequently redesigned its boilers so that they would utilize
the waste heat of the kilns and this resulted in a substantial decrease in
the amount of gas needed to power the boilers. The gas company's
attempt to enjoin the use of waste heat as a violation of the contract was
denied. The result was surely correct, but it was softened by the court's
language:
The term of the contract here involved was 15 years. That was
longer than the ordinary life of certain of the appliances and
equipment in the cement plant. It is a reasonable assumption that
the parties contemplated that whenever it became necessary to
renew worn-out equipment the Cement Company would install
modem equipment in its place. Certainly, the parties did not
contemplate that the contract should obligate the Cement Company
to replace worn-out equipment with a like type of equipment that
had become obsolete in the cement manufacturing industry, or not
to utilize fully, modem equipment when installed. We are of the
opinion that the Cement Company had the right to install modem
equipment whenever it was necessary to replace worn-out
equipment so long as in so doing it acted bona fide.
76 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988).
102 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1939).
There were some modifications which allowed it to use other natural gas which can
be ignored.
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The boiler plant of the Cement Company became worn out in 1933.
To replace it the Cement Company installed a modem boiler system
similar to the types generally used in other cement manufacturing
plants. In the improved plant a new or different fuel was not
substituted for gas, but a more efficient and economical utilization
of gas was effected, so that the heat resulting from the combustion
of the gas in the kilns was used both to heat the product in the kilns,
and the boilers.... In so improving its plant, the Cement Company
acted in good faith and in the exercise of prudent business
judgment. This it had the right to do.79
"Bona fide," "good faith," and "prudent business judgment"
presumably impose some constraints on the buyer. But what are the
constraints? If the relative price of an alternative fuel fell, could the
Cement Company switch? Would that be "imprudent?"
The most plausible explanation for the structure of the fifteen-year
contract is that the cement company needed assurance of a continued
supply and that replacement of Southwest by another supplier would
have been difficult. Southwest, on the other hand, likely supplied a
number of customers and had only modest relation-specific investments.
If that were indeed the case, then we would expect that the contract
would give the buyer considerable assurance of supply and the
flexibility to alter the amount taken as circumstances change. That does
not, of course, mean that the gas company need grant it unlimited
discretion. Possibly, it might want to confront the cement company with
an additional cost when it contemplated a change to a less gas-intensive
technology if relative prices or technology changed. But why rely on an
after-the-fact review by a court or jury guided by such loose language as
"good faith" or "prudent business judgment?" The parties could fine-
tune the gas company's protection in a number of ways. The simplest
would be to impose a minimum quantity, perhaps in the form of a take-
or-pay arrangement. Or the gas company could be given a right to
revise or terminate following the occurrence of certain events, such as a
change in relative prices of a certain magnitude, a reduction in quantity
beyond a certain point, or a finding by an arbitrator that the technology
has changed. Such protection was likely unnecessary, because I doubt
that the gas company had any need to protect its reliance. But why,
absent explicit language, should there be any presumption that the buyer
was promising to adapt inefficiently as new information became
available?
S.W. Natural, 102 F.2d at 633.
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In Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Colorado Westmoreland, Inc.,
8
0
Judge Easterbrook, sitting by designation, held in favor of a public utility
purchaser, which had substantially reduced its coal requirements.
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (NIPSCO) entered into long-term
contracts with Colorado Westmoreland Inc. (CWI) in 1977. The contracts
were renegotiated in 1980 and again in 1982. The dispute concerned
NIPSCO's performance under the last contract. That contract was for its
requirements at a particular generating facility. The contract included
both estimated requirements (about one million tons per year) and a
maximum annual obligation by the seller (1.25 million tons).81 In finding
for the utility, Judge Easterbrook provided elaborate detail on the nature
of the transaction and its negotiating history.
The contract was one of two NIPSCO contracts for low-sulphur
western coal. The other was with Carbon County Coal Company. After
fuel prices collapsed in the early 1980's NIPSCO sought declaratory
judgments regarding both contracts. It sought, and failed, to be excused
from the Carbon County contract, a fixed quantity contract with an
indexed price well above the current market price.82 In the CWI contract
dispute, NIPSCO sought a declaratory judgment that, despite a
substantial reduction in requirements, the contract was still in force. In
addition to these two contracts, NIPSCO was supplied by an unspecified
number of high-sulphur Midwestern coal companies with less expensive
coal. NIPSCO had eleven coal-fired generating units. The CWI contract
was for the requirements of one particular unit, Schahfer 15. To simplify
the story somewhat, when determining which units to operate, NIPSCO
had to balance the costs of generating at those units and the reliability of
the system; it also had to take into account directives from the regulatory
commission (economy purchase orders) and the possibility that the
commission would not allow it to recover all of its costs. As a
consequence, NIPSCO started using more high-sulphur and less low-
sulphur coal. In addition, hard times in the steel industry - a major
determinant of the demand for NIPSCO's power - led to a scaling back
of power needs. So, despite the contract estimate of approximately one
million tons of coal per year, requirements in 1983-1985 ranged from
667 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
" Id. at 614-15. The seller also agreed to use best efforts to meet requirements in excess
of 1.25 million tons; it is not clear whether the contract price would carry over to the
additional output. Id. at 615. The contract also placed a limit on the seller's total
commitment. Id. It could not enter into contracts with others which when added to the
coal it was obliged to deliver to NIPSCO would exceed the capacity of the mine. Id.
82 N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986)
(awarding Carbon County judgment of $181 million, but denying specific performance).
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573,000 tons to 713,000.3
CWI argued that a quantity reduction of this magnitude was not in
good faith, citing Comment 3 of UCC §2-306.4 Judge Easterbrook
rejected the argument on four grounds: (a) NIPSCO acted in commercial
good faith; (b) the variance from the estimate was only 45%; (c) the
parties dickered over the boundaries on the requirements and the court
should not read language into the agreement which the parties explicitly
chose not to include; and (d) the restrictions in the statute are
asymmetric, applying only to buyers who attempt to unduly increase
their requirements. 5
The most interesting aspect of the opinion for my purposes is the rich
description of the contractual alternatives considered by the parties
before they settled on the final language. CWI initially proposed a
minimum-take contract. Alternatively, CWI suggested a 900,000-ton
"walk away" provision. If NIPSCO ordered less than 900,000 tons in any
year, CWI would have the option of declining to fill the orders and
canceling the contract.8 With such a contract, if NIPSCO were concerned
about protecting its long-term supply of coal, then it might place orders
just to keep the agreement alive. In effect, by purchasing coal that it did
not need today, NIPSCO would be renewing its option to purchase coal
tomorrow. If NIPSCO did not exercise the option, then CWI could
choose to terminate the deal. The risk of termination would have been
one of the costs that NIPSCO would have to consider when deciding
whether it should order coal that it did not need today. All this was
moot as NIPSCO rejected both the minimum-take and the walk away
provision. In a proposed draft, NIPSCO proposed a clause that would
define the parameters of its discretion:
667 F. Supp. at 615. Requirements in 1986 were only 315,000 tons, but the parties
concede that was an aberration because of a fire in the mine and a steel strike. Id.
Id. at 635 (addressing requirements contracts). "If an estimate of output or
requirements is included in the agreement, no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to it
may be tendered or demanded. Any minimum or maximum set by the agreement shows a
clear limit on the intended elasticity. In similar fashion, the agreed estimate is to be
regarded as a center around which the parties intend the variation to occur." Id. at 636.
' Id. at 636. "Otherwise a requirements contract at a price that becomes advantageous
to the buyer would allow the buyer to become the middleman to the world, suddenly
deciding to sell the product in bulk or building new plants and 'requiring' vast quantities.
This has been a problem in the electricity business." Id. He then cites two of the cases
discussed in Section V (which I will argue were wrongly decided). See Utah Int'l, Inc. v.
Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 425 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1976); Lakeland v. Union Oil Co., 352
F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
Colo. Westmoreland, 667 F. Supp. at 636.
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[1] Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed to
require the use of coal for generation of electrical energy or to
prohibit Buyer from utilizing any and all other or substitute sources
of energy as may become available; [2] nor shall anything in this
Agreement be construed to require the purchase of more coal than
needed for the operation of Buyer's Schahfer Unit 15; [3] nor shall
anything in this Agreement be construed to cause Buyer to operate
Schahfer Unit 15 to any greater extent than Buyer in its sole
discretion deems prudent, either as to hours of operation or as to
load carried on said Schahfer Unit 15; [4] nor shall anything in this
Agreement be construed to prevent Buyer from operating any and
all of its generating stations, including Schahfer Unit 15, and
utilizing other sources of power supply in the most efficient,
economical, and prudent manner for the production and supply of
electrical energy for Buyer's Customers .... 87
In the course of the negotiations both the first and third clause were
eliminated. The first deletion means that the generating unit could not
be shifted to an alternative fuel without CWI's permission. The second
deletion is harder to explain because the language of the next clause
seems to allow NIPSCO to justify its decisions on roughly the same
grounds. Judge Easterbrook concluded that deleting the clause allowed
CWI to protect itself against irrational changes in requirements.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the contract would, with one exception, allow
the buyer to adapt to changed circumstances by varying its requirements
in a way that it reasonably perceived to be in its long-term economic
interest without having to get permission from, consult with, or pay
CWI. The exception, as noted, was a change in the relative price of fuels.
Again, it should be emphasized, this allocation of decision making was
hardly inevitable. Indeed, in its contract with Carbon County, NIPSCO
opted for a very different arrangement in which it sacrificed its quantity
flexibility. Carbon County had only one customer and the mine was
developed only after the contract had been entered into, so there was an
obvious interest in protecting the seller's reliance. On the other hand,
CWI's mine was already developed and the Schahfer unit built when the
parties entered into this requirements contract. It is not clear from the
opinion whether CWI had other customers (although its proposed "walk
away" term suggests strongly that it did). CWI needed less protection of
its reliance than did Carbon County and therefore was more willing to
'r Id. at 633.
The revised contract also tacked on a somewhat cryptic clause requiring that the
buyer treat the seller no less fairly than its other producers of coal. Id. at 615.
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give NIPSCO control of the quantity decision. Judge Easterbrook did not
allow the fine-tuning of the parties to be trumped by the wooden
standards of the UCC.
Judge Easterbrook's decision, which places the contract in its
commercial context, contrasts with three New York cases, which require
a firm to continue an operation, despite the lack of an explicit promise to
do so. Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc.,89 the leading New York case,
illustrates how the good faith implication complicates a simple case and
undoes a sensible allocation of decision making. Levy & Sons operated a
wholesale bread baking business. As part of its operations it generated
considerable waste product in the form of stale or imperfectly' appearing
loaves. One option for disposing of this material was to convert it into
"bread crumbs" by removing the labels, processing the loaves through
two grinders, toasting the product in an oven and bagging it. It
purchased the oven and entered into a one year evergreen (automatically
renewed) contract with the Crushed Toast Company which agreed to
purchase "all bread crumbs produced by the Seller in its factory at 115
Thames Street, Brooklyn, New York" 90 at a price of 60 per pound. Either
party could cancel on six months notice. The Crushed Toast Company
was required to deliver a "faithful performance bond," presumably to
provide assurance to Levy of timely removal of the waste. In the first
eleven months, Levy delivered about $30,000 worth of bread crumbs.
Apparently the operation was not profitable for Levy. It attempted to
renegotiate the contract price up to 7o, but was rebuffed. One month
before the end of the first year Levy dismantled the toasting oven and
ceased production of bread crumbs. The waste was then sold to animal
food manufacturers. Feld sued for breach.
The Supreme Court denied both parties' motions for summary
judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed over a strong dissent, which
would have (properly) granted Levy's motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed unanimously, rejecting the dissenters'
argument that the language was clear and unambiguous and that there
could be no inference that Levy had promised to continue to produce
bread crumbs to sell to plaintiff. The court first noted that output
contracts were not unenforceable because the seller was required to
conduct his business in good faith. The seller was not free to decide
whether he should produce any bread crumbs. "The seller's duty to
remain in crumb production is a matter calling for close scrutiny of its
335 N.E. 2d 320 (N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 321.
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motives."91 That scrutiny would require data on "the actual cost of the
finished bread crumbs to defendant, statements as to the profits derived
or the losses sustained, or data specifying the net or gross return realized
from the animal food transactions." 92 Moreover, "[s]ince bread crumbs
were but a part of defendant's enterprise and since there was a
contractual right of cancellation, good faith required continued
production until cancellation, even if there be no profit. In circumstances
such as these and without more, defendant would be justified, in good
faith, in ceasing production of the single item prior to cancellation only if
its losses from continuance would be more than trivial, which, overall, is
a question of fact."
93
The court failed to recognize that, in its own statement of the facts, it
had already provided the relevant economic data. The contract price
was 6o per pound and Levy's actions (dismantling the oven) indicate
that this amount would not even cover the variable costs; it was cheaper
to shut the project down. However, Levy indicated that a price of 7¢ per
pound would have been sufficient to warrant its continued operation of
the toaster oven. So, the fight is over one penny. The court gives no hint
as to how that information would help answer the question it has posed.
Further, it glosses over the question of why Levy's termination of an
operation that does not cover variable costs would be in bad faith. Given
the incoherence of the question, the elusiveness of the answer is hardly
surprising.
That this was an output contract rather than a requirements contract
matters not. It can be viewed as a requirements contract for a service -
waste removal.94 The deformed loaves and day old bread were waste
products that happened, by chance, to have a positive market value for
various uses. Suppose, instead that they were of no value and that Levy
had entered into a contract to have all its trash hauled away at a price of,
say, 30 a pound. The only difference is that the net flow of cash now
would be from Levy to Feld. Can one seriously argue that Levy has a
duty to stay in business to produce garbage for Feld to haul away? Yet
that is precisely what the court has done.
It is conceivable that a producer would, under certain circumstances,
promise to produce a specific level of a waste product. That, recall, was
what the oil refineries promised to the aluminum companies who were
91 Id. at 323.
9 Id.
93 Id.
" That would presumably get it out of the U.C.C.'s scope.
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building calciners in reliance upon the refineries' coke output.95  The
contrast between the GLC and aluminum contracts suggests the
conditions in which the parties might want to give substantial protection
to the trash remover's reliance interest. Those conditions are certainly
not met in Feld v. Levy. The facts are spotty, but a reasonable inference is
that the Crushed Toast Company was in existence prior to the formation
of this contract, that it had other suppliers; and that toasted bread
crumbs could be held in inventory at less expense and for a greater
period of time than unsold loaves of bread. Hence, its willingness to
subject itself both to Levy's discretion in determining the bread crumb
production and to post a faithful performance bond. The fact that Levy,
the party that had carefully protected its reliance because it had
purchased an oven for making bread crumbs and had a clear need to
assure the removal of unsold loaves, dismantled the oven should have
been sufficient to end the inquiry. Instead the court, under the banner of
good faith, encouraged a fruitless inquiry into the costs and revenues
associated with the two alternative ways of disposing of the waste.96
A half century earlier, the New York Court of Appeals mishandled a
similar case. In Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co.,97 the defendant,
a brewer, entered into an agreement in which it agreed to sell to the
plaintiff all the "wet grains" produced at its brewery for a five year
period, or until 500,000 barrels of beer had been brewed. Wet grains
were a waste product of the brewing process, which would then be dried
" See supra text accompanying notes 15-18. In some instances state and local
governments have built capital intensive waste treatment facilities, set high prices for waste
removal, and imposed "flow controls" limiting the ability of clients to dispose of their
waste outside the jurisdiction. These fencing-garbage-in ordinances have generated a
considerable amount of litigation. The Supreme Court found one such ordinance a
violation of the dormant commerce clause. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,
New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). For a sampling of post-Carbone flow control cases, many of
which turn back. challenges to the ordinances, see Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of
Houlton, 175 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1999); Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Wheelabrator
Environmental Systems, Inc., 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998); National Solid Waste Management
Association v. Williams, 146 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1998); Sal Tinnerello & Sons, Inc. v. Town of
Stonington, 141 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998); and Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin
County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1997).
' In another case involving sale of a waste product, Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing Co.,
171 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 1961), a brewery promised to sell all its waste grain to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff promised daily removal. Id. at 866. As in Feld, plaintiff was required to furnish a
surety company performance bond. After sustaining substantial losses, the brewer closed
the brewery. Id. Plaintiff's claim that the brewery should have continued to produce
grains was rejected. Id. at 868. More interesting than the outcome is the similar protection
of the seller's reliance - the requirement that the buyer post a bond to assure the removal
of the waste. Id. at 866.
118 N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1918).
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and sold as cattle feed. Wigand would, under the contract, install a plant
for drying the grains in Bachmann-Bechtel's brewery. It had in previous
years installed such plants in other breweries. The cost of installation
was $6,050, borne entirely by Wigand. At the end of the five years (or
after the 500,000 barrels had been produced), title to the drying plant
would be transferred to the brewer. Wigand's compensation would
come entirely in the form of a favorable price for the wet grains of 60 per
barrel of beer.9 The contract included an excuse clause broader than the
typicalforce majeure clause:
Should the party of the first part hereto be prevented from
operating its brewery by reason of strikes, break downs in
machinery, or for any reason whether beyond its control or
otherwise, then and in that event this contract and the performance
thereof by the party of the first part shall stand in abeyance until the
brewery of the party of the first part shall again be in operation.99
In the first 21 months the brewery produced 158,000 barrels of beer
and both parties complied with the contract. Then the brewer sold its
beer business (but not the physical plant) to another brewer. It
covenanted with the purchaser that it would not operate its brewery for
two years. It complied with the covenant and, for reasons unstated, did
not reopen the brewery even after the two years had expired. Wigand
sued and ultimately prevailed, although the Court of Appeals rejected
the jury verdict of $8,500 and remanded for a new trial.1°°
The court put great weight on Wigand's reliance on the brewery's
continued operation in concluding that the brewery had breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The mutual promises in the contract, many of which we have stated,
are such that a voluntary and intentional failure to perform by the
defendant would be inequitable and unjust. The large expenditure
by the plaintiff for machinery which he placed in the defendant's
plant for which pay could only be obtained by him through a
continuance of the business; the furnishing by him of $5,000 to the
defendant, only to be returned by deductions from the purchase
price of the wet grains received; the necessity of expenditures to
keep the plant in repair and for insurance as stated for the full
9 Id. In addition, Wigand advanced about $5,000 to the brewer for modifications of
the brewery so that the drying plant could be installed. That was to be paid back at $250
per month to be offset against Wigand's payments for wet grain. Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 619.
,0 Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 154 N.Y.S. 840 (1915).
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period of five years, are important facts to be considered in
determining what was meant by the defendant when it promised to
sell to the plaintiff "all of the wet brewery grains produced from the
brewing at its brewery" as in the contract provided.1° 1
In Feld, the seller had made the significant relation-specific investment
- the toasting oven. Here, the relation-specific investments (over $6,000
in pre-WWI dollars) were made by the buyer. Recoupment depended on
the continued operation of the brewery. Wigand could have reduced its
reliance by phrasing its compensation differently. Failing that, it might
have forced the brewery to take this reliance into account when making
decisions on how much beer to produce or whether to produce beer at
all. It could, for example, have insisted that if the brewery were shut
down, the brewer would have to purchase the drying plant for a fraction
of the $6,050 related to the length of time the drying plant had operated.
Instead it relied, 'not unreasonably, on the seller's self-interest. Under
most circumstances the brewer would find operating the brewery more
attractive than moth-balling or destroying it. But in those rare cases (as
the present) where the brewery seems to be worth more dead than alive,
Wigand's reliance remains unprotected, at least until the court comes in
and trumps the agreement. It is possible that the brewery might agree ex
ante that it would have to pay a fee to the waste removal firm if it chose
to go out of business to cover at least some of Wigand's reliance costs.
But is it likely? Other suppliers, notably workers, also relied on
continued operation of the brewery and presumably received nothing.
The court simply found an implausible duty to produce waste, imposing
a particular vision of the balance between discretion and reliance other
than the one designed by the parties.
In yet another tail-wags-dog opinion, the New York Court of Appeals
held that a Manhattan hotel should remain in operation for the benefit of
a parking garage (or pay the consequences). 1 4 The Savoy Hilton entered
into a five-year contract with the parking garage, promising to use
101 Wigand, 118 N.E. at 619..
0 Recall the discussion of Diamond Alkali and Central States. See supra text
accompanying notes 56-63. The decision does not discuss whether the brewery was
reopened by someone else or simply closed down.
1 Compare Wigand with Hamlyn, which also involved removal of the waste grains
from the brewery. See supra note 51. There, the court held that the brewery's
discontinuance did not create liability, even though production continued, albeit under
different ownership. Wigand, 118 N.E. 618, Hamlyn & Co. v. Wood & Co., 2 Q.B. 488, 488-
89 (1891).
"0 407 E. 61st Garage, Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Ave. Corp., 244 N.E.2d 37 (N.Y. 1968). I have
incorporated additional facts from the skimpy record. In addition to affidavits by the
principals, each side introduced an article from the New York Times. See infra note 106.
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reasonable efforts to enable the garage to have "the exclusive right and
privilege of storing the motor vehicles of [the hotel's] guests, tenants and
patrons."05  The garage agreed to pay the hotel 10% of the transient
storage charges incurred by the hotel guests. Thus, the garage paid a fee
for the hotel's encouraging patronage. The garage was about one-half
mile from the hotel. (Only in New York!) Savoy purchased the hotel
(which was over thirty years old) shortly before it entered into the
contract. Less than two years after entering into the agreement, Savoy
demolished the hotel. There was some dispute over the reason. The
owner claimed that it was losing money on the hotel and that there was
no hope of making it profitable. The plaintiff claimed that the real
reason for demolition was that the land had a higher and better use -
namely construction of a fifty-story office building (the General Motors
Building just south of Central Park). The plaintiff made much of the
motive in his affidavit and briefs, but the claims of both sides come
down to the same point: the hotel was worth more dead than alive.
The parking garage sued for damages for lost profits during the last
three years of the agreement."" Judge Breitel, speaking for a unanimous
Court of Appeals, reversed summary judgment for the hotel and
remanded. The court framed the question in a neutral way: "The real
issue in this case is... whether this agreement imports an implication
that Savoy was obligated to remain in the hotel business, or, better, had
undertaken indefeasible obligations for the full term."'0 8 It recognized
"the incongruity of an enterprise, as large as a metropolitan hotel, being
obligated to 'continue in the hotel business' merely because of various
relatively minor incidental service contracts, such as that involved
407 E. 61st Garage, 244 N.E.2d at 39.
'0 The garage did not attempt to obtain an injunction that would have given it the right
to hold out for a piece of the increased value of the office building. Id. at 38-9. A New York
Times article, introduced by the plaintiff, identified two tenants who did have the right to
throw a monkey wrench into the planned conversion. The two threatened to remain in
business if their terms were not met, and Savoy, in turn, threatened to raze the hotel
around them and construct the office building on the remainder of the site. See William
Robbins, New G.M. Building May Rise Around Two Tenants; Coffee House and Flower Shop
Owners May Stay Till Leases Expire, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1965, § 8, at 1.
" 407 E. 61st Garage, 244 N.E.2d at 42. While this was not a variable quantity contract,
the New York Supreme Court classified it as a requirements contract and granted summary
judgment to the hotel because there was no evidence of bad faith. Id. at 38. The Court of
Appeals held that "the agreement between the garage and Savoy is not a 'requirements'
contract, but is akin to the grant of a license or franchise by Savoy to the garage." Id. at 39.
The court then went on to note that categorization was not particularly helpful in analyzing
the case. Id.
I d. at 40.
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here."1' 9 Nonetheless, the court asserted a default rule: when the
promisee relies upon the promisor's continued activity, a promise to
remain in business will be implied. Savoy could avoid this result in two
ways. Ex ante, Savoy could have included an express term in the
contract that would terminate the agreement if the hotel went out of
business. Ex post, Savoy could invoke custom or usage in the industry
to show that incidental service contracts are terminable on the hotel's
going out of business.
So, the net result is a default rule, which could be overcome by explicit
contract language or by demonstrating that people in the industry knew
(or should have known) that the default rule does not apply here. The
court did not explain why the default rule should give complete
protection to the garage's reliance with no concern for the hotel's
discretion. Nor did it indicate how one should give content to the
custom and usage standard. Whose custom and usage? Hotels? Parking
garages? Hotels dealing with parking garages? In Manhattan? Would
the custom and usage depend on whether the garage owner relied upon
the contract in building the garage, whether the hotel customers
constituted 100% (or 50% or 5%) of the expected revenues of the garage?
The garage's interest in protecting its reliance depends crucially on these
matters. Under most circumstances, the garage would require only
modest, if any, protection of its reliance; indeed, the most plausible
scenario is that the multi-year agreement was designed to protect the
reliance of the hotel, which was concerned about the consequences of not
having a convenient parking garage nearby.
Suppose that instead of closing, Savoy had changed its business
strategy. Perhaps it chose to remodel and offer fewer, and larger, rooms.
Would it have to compensate the garage during the remodeling period
or for the lower number of potential patrons? Could it introduce a
subsidized airport shuttle service, which would result in a smaller
number of patrons with cars to be parked? Could it close the hotel
restaurant for lunches or on Monday evenings? Would it have to clear
its advertising budgets with the parking garage? Would we expect a
hotel to require approval from (or to promise payment to) a parking
garage as it adapts its business decisions to changing circumstances? If
the court does not mean to hold the hotel responsible for these decisions,
how does one draw the line between these and the decision to tear the
hotel down? Must these all be fact questions relying on proof of custom
and usage? It makes little sense to have a fact-sensitive default rule
" Id. at 41.
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where the fact is so elusive.
The three preceding cases are like shooting fish in a barrel, at least
when one is properly armed. Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co."'
presents a more difficult problem. After entering into a requirements
contract, the buyer changed his mind and had no requirements for the
life of the contract. The seller sued and won a jury verdict in excess of $3
million. On appeal, Judge Posner upheld the verdict. Although the
contract concerned potential sales of more than $5 million and was
between firms with combined sales in 1980 of around $1 billion, the
agreement was prepared by two laymen without, it appears, any
assistance from counsel."'
American Bakeries was a distributor of bakery goods in different parts
of the country, operating a large fleet of trucks. Concern over the energy
crisis of the late 1970's sparked interest in the possibility of converting
part of its fleet to the use of propane gas. It entered into a four-year
requirements contract with Empire for provision of conversion units
(approximately 3,000 "more or less, depending upon requirements of
Buyer " "') and propane motor fuel. The units would give the trucks the
capability of running on either fuel. Empire did not manufacture
conversion units; it would purchase them elsewhere and supply them to
American. The contract fixed the price for the conversion units ($750 a
piece), but did not give the brand or specifications. Empire had at least
five brands of conversion equipment in inventory and the court opinions
suggest that delivery of any of these would have been appropriate at the
contract price. Empire was not in the business of marketing conversion
equipment; its primary concern was sale of propane."3 American agreed
to take its requirements of propane from Empire at roughly the market
price. The pricing term was a loosely worded "meeting competition"
clause:
In consideration of providing propane dispensing equipment,
American Bakeries Company agrees to purchase propane motor fuel
solely from Empire Gas Corporation at all locations where Empire
Gas has supplied carburetion and dispensing equipment as long as
Empire Gas Corporation remains in a reasonably competitive price
posture with other major suppliers. Buyer may elect to call for price
840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988).
646 F. Supp. 269, 271 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1335.
13 "Empire Gas does not manufacture conversion equipment, but supplies it essentially
as an accommodation to the customers for its propane, the major part of its business." Id.
at 1336.
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negotiations at which time seller will have the opportunity to alter
buyer's price to buyer's satisfaction....
In addition, "Empire promised to provide [American] with propane
dispensing equipment, including a 1,000 gallon tank at no charge at all
locations where Empire supplied... dispensing services.""
5
After the parties signed the agreement, American advised Empire that
it was having financial difficulties. For over a year American failed to
take any conversion units or propane, but informed Empire that it
intended to honor the contract. Finally, Empire sent an invoice for the
purchase of 3,000 conversion units, which it claimed to be holding in
inventory. American refused to accept conversion units or pay for them
and Empire sued for lost profits both on the conversion units and the
propane. The jury concluded that, but for the breach, Empire would
have sold 2242 conversion units (an exactitude suggesting
capriciousness) to American. The jury also concluded that it had lost
profits on these sales of about $600,000, roughly 36% per unit and that
the lost profits from the foregone propane sales were $2.6 million.
Judge Posner suggested that, on the basis of the negotiating history,
the contract could have been interpreted as one for a fixed quantity of
conversion units. The reason for this conclusion is unclear because he
also noted that American rejected Empire's standard contract which
called for a minimum number of conversion units per month.
6
Regardless, the parties agreed that the agreement should be classified as
a requirements contract and therefore that it fell under UCC §2-306.
In interpreting UCC §2-306, Judge Posner adopted the majority
position holding that a reduction in requirements was constrained only
by the buyer's good faith, not by the "unreasonably disproportionate"
proviso."7  American would have been acting in bad faith had it
purchased conversion units or propane from competitors. 18 However, it
would not have been acting in bad faith "if it had a business reason for
deciding not to convert that was independent of the terms of the contract
or any other aspect of its relationship with Empire Gas, such as a drop in
the demand for its bakery products that led it to reduce or abandon its
"' Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1324, at 2 (N.D. I1. Feb.
19 1987). The court ignored the open-ended nature of the price term, focusing only on the
quantity term.
Id. at 8.
Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1338-39.
"' 840 F. 2d 1333 at 1339.
It is not clear why one would choose to characterize this as "bad faith" rather than as
a flat-out breach.
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fleet of delivery trucks."119 If American simply changed its mind without
a reason, this presented a more difficult case. The requirements contract
could plausibly be characterized as §iving American an option, but that,
Posner concluded, was not the law.
The essential ingredient of good faith in the case of the buyer's
reducing his estimated requirements is that he not merely have had
second thoughts about the terms of the contract and want to get out
of it. Whether the buyer has any greater obligation is unclear, but
need not be decided here. Once it is decided (as we have) that a
buyer cannot arbitrarily declare his requirements to be zero, this
becomes an easy case, because American Bakeries has never given
any reason for its change of heart.
12 1
Good faith, according to Judge Posner, puts a burden on the buyer to
give a valid business reason (other than "I changed my mind") for the
failure to take any goods. American did not give any reason and,
apparently, could not. Ergo, its action must have been in bad faith.'22
The contract differs from others discussed in this paper in that it was a
two-stage requirements contract. American agreed to buy all its propane
requirements from Empire; it would only have propane requirements if
it had conversion units and these too it promised to buy only from
Empire. It is useful to analyze the contract in two stages, beginning first
with the propane stage. Had American installed the conversion units,
its requirements would have depended on overall fuel needs (the
demand for its products) and on the relative cost of fuels. If gasoline
prices had fallen relative to propane, American could have reduced its
requirements to zero. That was precisely the flexibility it had bargained
for. It was crystal clear to both parties that the only reason to go through
Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1339.
'm "If no reason at all need be given for scaling back one's requirements even to zero,
then a requirements contract is from the buyer's standpoint just an option to purchase up
to (or slightly beyond, i.e., within the limits of reasonable proportionality) the stated
estimate on the terms specified in the contract, except that the buyer cannot refuse to
exercise the option because someone offers him better terms. This is not an unreasonable
position, but it is not the law." Id. at 1339.
121 Id. at 1340-41.
1 The dissent disagreed: "The majority thus transforms the seller's theoretical burden
of proof on bad faith (unarticulated to the jury) into an actual presumption of the buyer's
bad faith (articulated post-trial)." Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1343 (Kanne, Circuit J.
dissenting). Judge Kanne would have reversed and remanded because Empire had not met
the burden of proving bad faith, or, alternatively, because, if an unreasonably
disproportionate reduction in requirements creates a presumption of bad faith to be
rebutted by buyer's proof of good faith, this was not the rule under which the trial was
conducted. Id. at 1342-43.
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with this contract was to have vehicles that could use either fuel and to
allow Empire to choose the most efficient. If the two fuels were very
close substitutes, we should anticipate that fairly minor fluctuations in
relative prices would have resulted in dramatic shifts in American's
requirements. That is how Judge Posner interpreted the agreement.'
1
Empire could have demanded some limits on American's discretion to
protect its reliance. It is hard to imagine that much protection would
have been necessary, given the meeting competition clause and the fact
that Empire had a large number of propane customers at most locations.
Not surprisingly, the contract provided no explicit protection (e.g.,
minimum purchases of propane); Empire bore the risk that the relative
price of propane would rise and that American would purchase gasoline
instead.
Of course, because American never took any of the conversion units,
the propane requirements were never an issue. The requirements for
conversion units would also be sensitive to the relative prices of propane
and gasoline - not the day-to-day fluctuations that would have
determined propane requirements, but the long-term expected costs of
the alternative fuels. If, in time, American learned that the future price
of propane was expected to be relatively high, then the requirements
contract would give it the flexibility to adapt to the new information by
discontinuing installation of the conversion units. The seller could have
constrained the buyer's discretion by, in effect, imposing a cost if buyer
were to reduce its purchases. It could have done so by providing for a
specific minimum, or an installation schedule, or a flat payment to be
offset against future purchases. American had, recall, rejected Empire's
initial proposal, which would have required installation of a minimum
114number of units. The parties' failure to include protection of Empire's
reliance in their agreement was no accident; it reflected the low value of
that protection.
If, because of a shift in relative prices, American concluded that it
would no longer be profitable to purchase additional conversion units,
11 "American Bakeries objects violently to the assumption made by Empire Gas's
expert witness that the vehicles converted by American Bakeries, had it honored what
Empire Gas contends were its obligations under the contract, would have run 100% on
propane. The conversion units would have been dual units, which permit the driver by a
flick of a switch in the engine to run his vehicle on either gasoline or propane. But since the
parties agree that the price of propane was lower than that of gasoline throughout the
entire contract period, a driver would have switched his conversion unit to gasoline only
when he was low on propane and too far away from a propane station to reach it before he
ran out. This factor was not big enough to upset the expert witness's calculations
significantly." Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1341-42.
1 Id. at 1335. See supra note 16.
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then it could cut back or eliminate its requirements. That is the efficient
response and, unless an aggressive definition of good faith were
interposed, that would be the outcome. The point is twofold. The parties
could have explicitly limited the buyer's discretion to adapt to changed
circumstances, but chose not to. Further, it is doubtful that the courts,
using an open-ended standard like good faith, could provide a default
rule better than the zero-protection rule - if the contract is silent, the
seller imposes no fee to protect its reliance and the buyer has absolute
discretion to cut back or eliminate requirements.
There was no evidence that relative prices had changed. Indeed,
Judge Posner noted that propane prices stayed below those of gasoline
for the entire period.'2' The facts are unclear, but the only changed
circumstances appear to be either that American's financial condition
deteriorated or that it simply got cold feet. Posner's opinion holds that
cold feet are not enough, although the relative price change most likely
would have been. In that sense, his interpretation is far more respective
of the contract language than the Feld or Wigand courts. But that does
present a puzzle. Why would the seller be willing to bear the risk of
relative price changes, but not the lesser risk of the buyer changing his
mind?
Unlike most of the other contracts discussed in this paper, the
underlying business sense of the contract is not clear. American did not
enter into this agreement to assure a supply of conversion units. The
units were produced by a number of suppliers with Empire only an
intermediary. It could easily have found such units on the open market.
That part of the agreement was most likely ancillary to the fuel
requirements contract. It is not obvious why American would want to
take all its fuel requirements from Empire. 12 Perhaps it was desperate to
line up any fuel sources in that era of shortages and rationing; perhaps it
would have been vulnerable to short-term inventory fluctuations and it
was buying assurance of a continuous supply of propane. On this, Judge
Posner is silent. Indeed, his only invocation of reliance is with regard to
the seller's reliance on the estimated requirements.127 Given that Empire
Empire Gas, 840 F.2d at 1342.
Perhaps Empire used the tied sale to circumvent price controls, charging an above
market price on the conversion units. There is no evidence of this in the opinion.
" "The statement of an estimate invites the seller to begin making preparations to
satisfy the contract, and although no reliance expense was incurred by the seller in this
case, a seller is entitled to expect that the buyer will buy something like the estimated
requirements unless it has a valid business reason for buying less. More important than
the estimate.., is the fact that ordinarily a requirements contract is terminated after
performance has begun, rather than before as in the present case. Whether or not the seller
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sold propane to a large number of accounts, its reliance on any particular
one was likely trivial; its failure to protect its reliance in the contract is
consistent with this.
The lost profits remedy provided a ludicrously high level of protection
for Empire's reliance. The damages are the markups on commodities
that Empire bought and sold in competitive markets. Empire stocked
and resold conversion units made by others. The contract was for sale of
a commodity, propane, at roughly the market price (given the meeting
competition clause). The jury found, in effect, that American agreed to
pay for 30% of the estimated 3,000 conversion units whether it took them
or not. That outcome, as Judge Posner observed, was due at least in part
to American's litigation strategy. American attacked Empire's damage
estimates but did not present its own. "American Bakeries gambled...
[;] we will not relieve it of the consequences of its risky strategy." '2 The
court was unwilling to use the damage assessment to make any
inferences about the plausible contract structure. The seller could not
have wanted nearly so much protection of its reliance. 29
Ironically, in an earlier decision, Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.,1
30
Judge Posner held a minimum guarantee clause to be an unenforceable
penalty, although the penalty was no worse than the one imposed by the
Empire Gas jury. Lake River had installed a bagging system for $89,000,
in reliance on the contract. Had the buyer breached immediately, it
would have owed $533,000, which Posner found an unreasonably high
penalty. In Empire Gas, Empire's reliance expenditures were $0 and the
damages in the millions thanks to the "lost profits" formulation. Illinois
law might well require both outcomes. I think one could come to the
opposite (and preferable) result under existing law,' but it would
certainly require fewer contortions if the Code were revised to deal with
the problems cleanly.
I will conclude this Section with one more illustration of the
importance of proper framing. In Indiana American Water Co. v. Town of
can prove reliance damages, the sudden termination of the contract midway through
performance is bound to disrupt his operations somewhat." Empire Gas Corp., 840 F.2d at
1340.
11 Id. at 1342.
" The high measure of damages could conceivably arise from the tie-in alluded to in
note 126. Again, there is no evidence that this is the case.
130 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
131 Judge Posner's lengthy discussion in Lake River of the merits of a penalty and the
questionable wisdom of enforcing the rule against penalties in a contract between
sophisticated commercial entities indicates that he is not happy with the outcome. See Lake
River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1288-93.
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Seelyville, 13 the court held that a buyer under a requirements contract to
take up to one million gallons of water per day for 25 years from the
water company did not breach the agreement when, fifteen years into
the contract, it decided to develop a wellfield that it already owned to
meet part of its water demands, thereby eliminating its requirements. It
distinguished an earlier decision 133 in which a golf course, which had
agreed to buy water under a requirements contract was held to have
breached that contract by purchasing a wellfield in order to obtain its
own supply of water. On what ground was it distinguished? The buyer
in the present case had owned the (undeveloped) wellfield for many
years before the present contract was executed; it had not purchased or
otherwise acquired its weilfield during the term of the contract.
Purchasing and developing a wellfield after the contract was entered
into is "bad faith," but developing a wellfield already owned is "good
faith." It is easy to imagine contract language that would have preserved
the buyer's option to develop its own property; it is even conceivable
that parol evidence would indicate that the water company was aware of
the buyer's ownership of the field. It is even plausible that the contract
was designed to protect the buyer's reliance, because the water company
likely had a portfolio of customers and the buyer a dearth of alternative
suppliers of water. The blinders of faith, good or otherwise, led the court
to hinge the decision on an irrelevancy and obscured the questions that
ultimately mattered.
V. LARGE QUANTITY INCREASES IN LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
The notion that one party might take undue advantage of a favorable
market-contract price differential in a requirements or output contract is
at the core of the Code's concern about unreasonably disproportionate
demands.'3 In long-term contracts, the parties generally include
boundaries on the quantity-determining party's discretion. Courts
invoking good faith sometimes disregard these boundaries. In this
Section, I discuss four cases in which the court pared back the buyer's
requirements. I conclude with an analysis of a case in which the court
found for a seller in an output contract, despite a huge increase in
output.
132 698 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
133 Andersen v. La Rinconada Country Club, 40 P.2d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).
If the price were favorable, a buyer might attempt to increase its requirements in a
particular year by accumulating inventory. For an early example of a buyer attempting to
do so (and the court rejecting that attempt) see Manhattan Oil Co. v. Richardson Lubricating
Co., 113 F. 923 (2nd Cir. 1902).
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In Utah International, Inc. v. Colorado-Ute Electric Ass'n, Inc.,' 1 the seller
desperately wanted out of a bad contract. In April 1973, after three years
of negotiation, the parties entered into a 35-year coal supply contract.
The seller agreed to provide the coal requirements for two new
generating units, each with a capacity of 350,000 kilowatts. The court did
not say, but it appears that the contract required that the seller develop a
new mine. The buyer's discretion was limited in two ways. First, the
seller's total obligation over the 35 years was limited to 1830 trillion
Btu's. Second, the buyer's annual obligation was to pay for 85% of the
expected coal consumption of the two generators, regardless of whether
it actually took the coal. The contract included a schedule of expected
consumption for the entire period. That is, the contract appears to have
been a take-or-pay contract with an annual maximum set by the buyer's
requirements and a total maximum amount for the 35-year period.
There is no mention in the decision of any other restrictions (e.g.,
makeups) on the timing of the buyer's taking of the 1830 trillion Btu's.
The oil price shock of 1973 caused coal prices to go up well beyond the
contract rate and, as in many other fuel disputes of the era, the seller
wanted to either renegotiate or abrogate the contract. It claimed that the
buyer had ordered generators with a capacity of 410,000 kilowatts
without informing the seller. It also contended that the size was an
essential condition of the contract and by building units of this size the
buyer had abrogated the contract.
The court had no difficulty in finding that the contract should be
enforced. More problematic was the integration of the quantity terms.
Colorado-Ute's construction of larger generators was, the court ruled, a
breach of the contract, but that did not require a forfeiture.'3 The buyer
was required to pay for the first 85% of its estimated coal consumption
(the minimum annual amount) regardless of whether it could use the
coal at the new generators. What if it needed less? The court held that it
could (but was not obliged to) take coal below the minimum quantity
and resell that coal on the open market. What if it needed more? The
court split the baby. The court simply eliminated the requirements
element. The seller had no obligation to sell coal beyond the minimum
annual amount. If it did so, the sale would be pursuant to a new
agreement, with terms, including price, to be negotiated. Given the huge
post-1973 increase in coal prices, that was a significant victory for the
425 F.Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1976).
1 My guess is that if the contract price had not diverged from the market price the
seller would have been delighted by the "breach" since it would have resulted in the seller
receiving its revenue sooner.
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seller.
The court did not reproduce the contract language. The court's lack of
an organizing framework helped produce an inconsistent statement of
facts. There seems to be a conflict between the stated capacity of the two
generating plants and the total quantity. I will try to sort this out, and I
apologize in advance to the patient reader for the following somewhat
tedious calculations. The contract specified the estimated sales for each
of the 35 years. That sum was only about 80% of the maximum
obligation (the 1830 trillion Btu's). If the larger generators were used
with the same rate of capacity utilization that was used in determining
the annual estimates, the 1830 trillion Btu ceiling would not have been
reached. It is reasonable to assume that if the smaller generators had
been operated at capacity, they would have bumped into the 1830 trillion
Btu ceiling before the end of the 35 years; otherwise the ceiling would
have been completely irrelevant. The only effect of installing the larger
generators, therefore, would be a change in the timing of the buyer's
requirements so that the contract maximum could be reached sooner. (If
they could not have reached that ceiling with the smaller generators,
then one would be hard-pressed to explain why the parties included two
apparently inconsistent terms in the agreement.) Given the huge
increase in coal prices, the change in timing mattered to the parties, ex
post. But, ex ante, when they entered into the contract and when
Colorado-Ute changed the size of the generators (pre-oil shock), the
change in timing was likely unimportant; prices could as easily have
fallen (as they did in the 1980's).
The seller had agreed to make enough coal available to produce 1830
trillion Btu's over 35 years, and to be paid for about 2/3 of it, even if the
buyer decided to take none. At most, the generator size placed limits on
the timing. If the capacity of the two units was indeed a term of the
contract, then the ceiling on the buyer's annual requirements would be
defined thereby. The buyer should not be allowed to insist upon delivery
of coal beyond that ceiling - the capacity of the smaller units. That,
rather than the court's baby-splitting, would have been the resolution
consistent with the terms of the agreement.
Assuming, as we must, that the smaller generators had sufficient
capacity to yield the 1830 trillion Btu maximum within the 35-year time
frame, we can calculate backward to determine Colorado-Ute's
maximum annual requirements for running those generators. (This
gives only an approximation - had the court understood the case better,
it could have obtained a more precise figure.) That would set a ceiling
for the seller's annual responsibility. A little fiddling with the numbers
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yields a maximum take about 50% greater than the contractually defined
minimum take, the precise number depending on how much the
potential output of the smaller generators would have exceeded the 1830
Btu ceiling over the life of the agreement.37 While the seller's maximum
annual obligation was not so well-defined as the minimum annual take,
it was certainly ascertainable by reference to the plant's capacity. In
addition, the seller's total obligation over the 35 years was precisely
defined. The court just chose to disregard this in rewriting the deal.
Perhaps the court's paring back of the seller's obligation was an informal
attempt to share the wealth. The court did not explicitly take the price
history of coal into account, but the outcome might reflect its discomfort
with the buyer receiving so large a share of the windfall, especially when
it apparently behaved in a less than exemplary manner.138
In both City of Lakeland, Florida, v. Union Oil Co. of California139 and
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp.,140 the purchaser
of fuel oil substantially increased its requirements following an increase
in the market price. The increased requirements were due both to
substitution of oil for gas and increased wholesale sales. In both
instances the courts disallowed the full increase, although the courts
differed in their treatment of the two. In each case the buyer's
requirements were limited by the capacity of its plant and the court held,
implicitly, that good faith required that the buyer run its plant at below
full capacity.
The City of Lakeland, Florida owned power plants that could be fired
by burning natural gas, Bunker "C" oil, or a mixture of the two. It
entered into a ten-year contract for the primary fuel, natural gas, in 1960.
137 Suppose that the 350 kilowatt plant operating at full capacity exactly exhausted the
1830 trillion Btu ceiling. Then the annual schedule of expected consumption would have
them producing at 80% of capacity. Their minimum take was 85% of the expected
consumption, or 68% of capacity (.80x.85). Since 100/68=1.47, the contract maximum
would be 47% greater than the contract minimum. If the capacity of the smaller plants
were greater (so that the 1830 trillion Btu constraint mattered), then the annual schedule
would yield a lower level of capacity utilization. The ratio of the maximum the buyer
could have demanded to the minimum the buyer had agreed to take would therefore be
larger. If, for example, the annual schedule assumed operation at only 75% of capacity,
then the minimum take would be 64% of capacity (.75x.85) and the ratio of the maximum to
the minimum take would be 1.56.
1" Havighurst and Berman noted long ago: "No court will admit that price fluctuation
is a factor of legal significance. This is a risk supposedly anticipated and assumed by the
seller when the contract is made. However,... it may have its effect in making the court
reluctant to allow recovery or at least anxious to find means to cut down the measure of
damages." Havighurst, et al., supra note 1, at 5.
3 352 F. Supp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
.4. 397 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1977).
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That contract, not at issue here, specified a minimum amount of gas the
City must take. However, it also gave the City a right to terminate if
Bunker "C" oil became available at a more favorable price that the gas
company refused to match. The fuels were interchangeable, but they
differed in their method of delivery. Oil is transported by carrier and
stored in on-site tanks; gas is received from transmission lines with no
on-site storage. Difficulties in transmission or increased consumption
might result in interruption of gas supply, particularly in cold weather.
In 1968 the City entered into a contract with Union Oil for provision of
Bunker "C" as a stand-by or alternate fuel. The contract price was $2.28
or the going market price plus specified transportation costs (which at
the time of first delivery was $2.16), whichever was smaller. It was a
five-year contract with Lakeland having the option to terminate every
year. If the supply of natural gas were interrupted, the City could take
all its fuel requirements from Union Oil. Moreover, if the contract price
of oil fell below that of natural gas, the buyer could take 100% of its fuel
requirements from Union Oil.
In the first three years, the share of oil increased from 20% to 40% to
56%. In the third year, in May 1970, the City entered into a new gas
contract, which set a fixed price for gas of 3.3¢ per therm (equivalent to
about $2.08 per barrel of oil) plus an escalation factor based on the
market price of oil. So long as the market price of oil was less than $2.47,
gas remained the cheaper fuel. Rising oil prices in late 1970 brought the
adjusted gas price above that and the City shifted a substantial amount
of its purchases to oil. When the City notified Union in June 1971 that it
elected to continue the agreement for the fourth year, Union responded
that it would no longer be willing to sell at the contract price. The City
sued for injunctive relief and damages.
Union Oil argued that the agreement was not valid because the City's
promise was illusory. Natural gas and oil are, Union argued, the same
commodity, so the City was at liberty to buy the same commodity from
others (the gas company) if it so desired.
There can be no doubt, under the literal terms of the contract...
that the City is free to purchase as much or as little Bunker "C" oil
as it may want from Union, i.e., "capriciously desire." Hence, the
prime question is whether the City is also at liberty to purchase the
same article or commodity from other suppliers as well. Union
insists that it is, arguing that gas and oil are "apples and apples,"
that both are fuels subject to interchangeable or even simultaneous
use. As a result, because the agreement also permits the City to
purchase natural gas in any amount it desires, Union would
Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts
conclude that the contract contains no promise at all sufficient to
supply a valid consideration.1
4
1
The court dismissed this argument noting that the agreement
"expressly contemplated the possibility of a conversion from gas to oil as
the primary fuel," and denying that interchangeability rendered gas and
oil the same commodity.42 Because oil was a different commodity, if the
City elected to take any oil at all, it was bound to take it from Union.
That was sufficient to dispel the illusory nature of the promise and
permit the court to find consideration.
That reasoning suggests that, had both contracts been for oil, the court
would have found for Union. The promise was given substance, the
court reasoned, not by good faith, but by the exclusivity - if the buyer
chose to take oil, it could only take from Union Oil. Suppose, however,
that both suppliers were supplying Bunker "C" oil. Union Oil had
granted the buyer a zero-price option to take any quantity of oil up to a
maximum (set by the buyer's capacity) at a contractually determined
price. The buyer received assurance of supply continuity and an option
to take fuel at the lower net price; the contract price and the seller's
expected sales were high enough to make the deal appear attractive to
the seller, as indeed it was for most of the first three years of the
agreement. The benefit to both parties should provide the consideration,
not the exclusivity.
Union Oil also argued that if this were a valid contract, the City had
abused its discretion by increasing its purchases in a matter not
contemplated by the parties. It had converted fuel oil from a standby
fuel to the primary fuel and had increased its overall demand for fuel oil
by increasing its wholesale sales to Tampa Electric, a public utility. The
court dismissed the former argument, noting that the contract was quite
specific in allowing the buyer to do so. It accepted the latter, however,
pointing out that initial sales to Tampa had been less than 1% of
electricity production, but that they had grown to over 13% by 1971.
The simple fact is that Union entered into an agreement which later
proved to be improvident, from its point of view, when the market
price of oil advanced to unforeseen heights. The City, on the other
hand, realized a concomitant advantage; and that is precisely what
the business and the law of contracts is all about. This is not to say,
however, that the City may add insult to injury by taking undue
Lakeland, 352 F.Supp. at 764.
' Id. at 765.
143 Recall the discussion of Propane Industrial. See text accompanying note 47.
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advantage of its favorable contract and increase its wholesale
exchange of energy with a neighboring system. Such increases must
be regarded as beyond the contemplation of the parties and the
scope of the contract, and must be taken into account as a limiting
factor in determining the damages to be awarded to the City.'"
The only contractual limit on Lakeland's requirements was its
generating capacity, known to both parties at the time of contracting. If
Lakeland had shifted to using fuel oil for 100% of its internal needs, that
would have been acceptable, according to the court. Apparently,
Lakeland's capacity had not been fully utilized. The court appears to
conclude that the existing level of underutilization was an implied term
in the contract; increased utilization in response to the favorable price
somehow "added insult to injury." The court provides no hint as to
why, in the absence of any explicit language, the requirements should be
bounded by the existing level of capacity utilization rather than the more
natural actual generating capacity.
Amerada Hess is oft-cited as an example of a buyer unreasonably
expanding its requirements in response to an increase in the market
price. Properly framed, this is an easy case, which the court bungled
(with the approval of most commentators).45 The parties entered into a
ten-year contract in December 1969 in which Amerada Hess agreed to
supply O&R's requirements for fuel oil No. 6 for its Lovett generating
plant in Tompkin's Cove, New York.14 The contract required Hess to
lease a parcel of land from O&R and erect storage facilities to which it
would deliver the fuel oil. The price for the first five years was $2.14 per
barrel, subject to escalation for cost-related factors. 47 The quantity clause
specified estimated annual sales for the five years. It was expected that
the primary fuel at the plant would be gas; projections were for gas to
account for about 60% of the Btu's generated by the plant. However, the
contract stated: "[nothing] herein shall preclude the use by Buyer of...
natural gas in such quantities as may be or become available."'
4 8
'" Lakeland, 352 F.Supp at 768.
145 See, e.g., BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 7, at 129; Alan Schwartz, Relational
Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 271, 298 (1992); Silkworth, supra note 1, at 235.
14 The facts are taken from this decision and a prior dispute between the parties in
which Hess was enjoined from terminating the contract. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc. v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 324 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1971).
17 The price for the second term would be renegotiated. If the parties failed to reach
agreement, the contract would terminate. See Amerada Hess, 67 Misc. 2d 560, 561 (1971); 324
N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1971).
" Amerada Hess, 397 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (1977).
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Five months after the contract was signed, the price of fuel oil began to
rise. By March of 1971 it had more than doubled. O&R increased its fuel
oil requirements by over 60% in 1970 and continued to order quantities
that were more than double the contractual estimates. In April 1971,
Hess unilaterally attempted to raise the price by 97.7 cents per barrel and
threatened to terminate deliveries if O&R declined. O&R obtained a
preliminary injunction enjoining Hess from ceasing delivery of the fuel
oil.1 9 Apparently, this did not prevent Hess from limiting its sales to the
contract estimates. O&R purchased additional fuel oil at the market
price and sued Hess for the difference for fuel oil purchased through
September 1973.1r°  The trial court dismissed its complaint and the
Appellate Division affirmed. O&R's requirements, said both courts,
were not incurred in good faith. They were, as a matter of law,
unreasonably disproportionate.
O&R could not (and did not) take oil under the contract and resell it at
the higher market price. It could only demand fuel oil to supply the
needs of the Lovett plant. Its requirements increased over the estimated
needs for two reasons. First, it increased its sales to the New York Power
Pool, in effect sharing with other utilities the benefits of its below-market
price. Second, it substituted oil for gas at the Lovett plant.
The former factor is tantamount to making the other utilities in the
state silent partners to the contract,.. . while the latter factor
amounts to a unilateral and arbitrary change in the conditions
prevailing at the time of the contract so as to take advantage of
market conditions at the seller's expense.... Hess was therefore
justified in 1970 in refusing to meet plaintiff's demands, by reason of
the fact that plaintiff's "requirements" were not incurred in good
faith.151
Again, the court uses "good faith" to impose a quantity ceiling short of
the plant's capacity. The contract placed a clear limit on O&R's
maximum demand - the capacity of the Lovett generating plant. It
should surprise no one in the industry that if the relative prices of oil and
gas change, the buyer would react in the appropriate manner. Nor was
the existence of the New York Power Pool a deep secret. O&R's
requirements depended only in part on the electricity demand of their
direct customers. The contract gave O&R flexibility both in its choice of
149 Amerada Hess, 67 Misc.2d 560, 562.
' Hess's obligation terminated prematurely because of an environmental regulation
that went into effect in October 1973. Amerada Hess, 397 N.Y.S.2d 817. Ironically, the huge
run up in oil prices began almost exactly when the contract terminated. Id.
1 Amerada Hess, id. at 820.
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fuel and its dealings with the power pool. If Hess wanted to place
tighter limits on O&R's discretion it would have been easy to do so. It
could have included a quantity maximum short of the plant's capacity or
tied its supply obligation to the market price. Or it could have
constrained O&R's ability to take advantage of changes in the relative
price of fuels. Recall that interfuel substitutability was specifically
112
bargained over in the NIPSCO-CWI dispute. To be sure, Hess did not
anticipate the price increase in 1970 (let alone the much larger increase
after October 1973), but that risk was allocated to Hess in the contract.
By interposing the "unreasonably disproportionate" standard, the courts
deprived O&R of the flexibility it had bargained for, converting the
contract into a (nearly) fixed quantity contract. As in Lakeland, the court
implicitly ruled that the seller had promised to run its plant at less than
full capacity for the life of the agreement, never asking why on earth a
party would make such an odd promise.
In neither Lakeland nor Amerada Hess, did the seller increase its
requirements by expanding its plant. Nor, under the contracts, could
they.13 The physical limits of the plant were the only constraints on their
discretion. The contracts could have imposed further limits on interfuel
substitution, sales to non-end users (Tampa Electric and the New York
Power Pool), or total sales. Or they could have set price as a function of
annual power sales (perhaps allowing for renegotiation of the price for
all sales above a certain level.) Apparently, they felt these additional
constraints unnecessary. In fact, the Lakeland contract explicitly rejected
limits on interfuel substitution. In both instances the court rewrote the
contract placing additional constraints on the seller's discretion•
A much earlier case, Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate
Co., 155 posed a slight variation on these cases. Loudenback entered into a
five-year requirements contract to purchase rocks in order to make
1S2 See supra text accompanying note 87.
Judge Easterbrook missed this point in his implicit approval of the two decisions in
his NIPSCO decision. See note 87.
"5 In Cullinan v. Standard Light & Power Co., 65 S.W. 689, 690 (1901), the buyer agreed to
take "oil sufficient to run their... plant in Dallas, Texas," maintaining the option to cancel
the contract if oil fuel was not satisfactory as compared to coal. When the price of oil rose
by forty percent, the buyer (according to the seller's complaint) ordered "immense
quantities of oil, ostensibly for use in running its plant in Dallas, but really for the purpose
of speculation, and of cheating and defrauding [seller] out of the 20 cents per barrel
advance in price." The district court's sustaining of the buyer's demurrer was, quite
properly, reversed. Diversion of the oil for resale would be a clear breach of the agreement.
There was no allegation of such a breach in either Lakeland or Hess.
" Loundenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298, 299 (6th Cir.
1903).
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fertilizer, with a 3,000 ton annual maximum. In the first two years it
ordered none. After a doubling of the market price of rocks in the third
year it ordered 3,000 tons, which the seller refused to deliver. The court
sustained the seller' demurrer, saying that the buyer's failure to take
any rocks in the first two years was a breach of the agreement. Burton
and Andersen argue that the court's decision in favor of seller was based
on buyer's opportunistic demand for the maximum, not it's failure to
take in the first two years.156
Why did the buyer take no rocks in the first two years? The rocks
were an input into an intermediate product, namely acidulated rocks. In
the first two years it was cheaper to buy acidulated rocks directly rather
than to make by combining seller's rocks with sulphuric acid, because,
the buyer claimed, there had been a large increase in the price of
sulphuric acid. In the third year, however, with acidulated rock prices
up and sulphuric acid prices down, it was cheaper to make. In both
Lakeland and Hess the increased quantity demand was in response to a
fall in the relative price vis a vis a substitute. In Loudenback, it was in
response to a fall in the relative cost of a product produced internally
versus that same product already "assembled." Perhaps the parties did
not mean to give the buyer the discretion to respond to such price
changes. Or perhaps one could argue that the requirements contract
covered both the raw material and the assembled product (although the
court does not come close to saying that). The minimal statement of the
facts gives no indication of why either party would want a multi-year
contract, or why the quantity discretion was given to the buyer. Absent
any facts, the most natural interpretation would seem to be that the
buyer agreed to buy between zero and 3,000 tons per year with the
actual quantity depending on the overall demand for its fertilizer and the
relative costs of make versus buy. Rather than sustaining the seller's
demurrer, the court should have granted summary judgment to the
buyer (perhaps leaving the window open for some narrow defenses).
In The Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 57 a closely
divided court upheld a buyer's claim despite a huge increase in the
quantity it demanded. The dispute involved a long-term take-or-pay
contract - the Gas Purchase Agreement (GPA) - entered into in 1979.
It was typical of contracts entered into at that time by pipelines in
general and Tennessee in particular in both the length and the
commitment to a high take-or-pay option. It did have one unusual
feature, as we shall soon see. Market conditions changed dramatically
116 BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 7, at 47-49.
11 Lenape Res. Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 925 S.W.2d 565 (1996).
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shortly afterward, leading to industry wide renegotiation and litigation.
One court noted:
In the 1980s, ... conflicting forces increased the gas supply, yet
decreased demand, thereby leading to a sharp decline in sales and
market price. Thus, pursuant to their long term take-or-pay
contracts, pipelines were required to buy gas at a cost significantly
above the market price at which they could later sell it. Confronted
with the prospect of bankruptcy, many pipelines refused to either
take or pay for gas, despite their contractual commitments.
Producers recognized that instability among the pipelines would
ultimately be detrimental to their own interests by causing massive
dislocation within the industry. Resultingly, most pipelines and
producers agreed to reform their contracts and settle their
disputes.l 8
In 1983 and again in 1985-86 Tennessee informed its producers that it
would refuse to honor its take-or-pay obligations. Not all the producers
caved in graciously. Settlements of some of Tennessee's litigation are
described in Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co.5 9 and Williamson v. Elf
Aquitaine, Inc.16° Lenape did acquiesce initially, 16 but in response to a
1989 suit against it by its lessors for breach of the implied covenant to
develop its leases, Lenape developed new wells, dramatically increasing
its production, thereby precipitating this litigation.
" Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
" Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Ref. Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 159-64 (Tex. App. 1991).
Tennessee settled by paying Hamman $8 million. Hamman was a lessee who had to pay
royalties to the landowners. The lessors argued that they were entitled to a share of the $8
million; the court held that the lessors were not entitled to royalties on gas not produced.
1 Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 138 F.3d 546, 549-52 (5th Cir. 1998). Tennessee
entered into a confidential settlement in 1985 revising the terms and paying a flat fee of
about $600,000. After further hassles the parties entered into a second settlement in 1987,
again revising the terms with Tennessee paying an additional $6 million. The litigation, as
in Mandell, involved unsuccessful claims by the lessors against the producer for royalties
on the side payment.
161 The Court of Appeals noted that "Lenape recognized as early as 1983 that it could
file suit against Tennessee for breach of the GPA, but that it made a business decision 'to let
the big boys fight that battle' rather than to file suit." See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lenape
Res. Corp., 870 S.W.2d 286, 304 (1993).
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The GPA reflected Tennessee's weak bargaining position in 1979.162 It
agreed to take, on a take-or-pay basis, 85% of Lenape's delivery capacity
(defined as the amount of gas that could efficiently be withdrawn from
the wells) of the defined gas reserves in a particular field. The decision
as to the development of the fields was left exclusively in Lenape's
hands. The contract specifically reserved the seller's right:
[t]o operate its property free from any control by Buyer in such a
manner as Seller, in its sole discretion, may deem advisable,
including without 'limitation, the right, but never the obligation, to
drill new wells, to repair and rework old wells, and to plug any well
or surrender any lease or portion thereof .... 13
Production in the first twelve years was modest, with annual
payments never exceeding $300,000. Following the development of the
new wells, there was a huge increase in production. In 1993 Tennessee
paid, under protest, $89 million. It sought a declaratory judgment that
the increased production was in bad faith and unreasonably
disproportionate to prior production. Alternatively, it argued that if the
contract were not governed by UCC §2-306, then the agreement was void
and unenforceable for lack of mutuality.
The trial court's decision for Lenape was reversed by the Court of
Appeals; the Texas Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote reversed that decision.
There was considerable disagreement as to whether the GPA was an
output contract subject to §2-306. The majority's ostensible ground for
concluding that it was outside §2-306 was that the Section applies "only
when a contract does not unambiguously specify the quantity of the
output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer."16 This, however,
fails to distinguish the GPA from other carefully crafted agreements
delineating the limits of the quantity-determining party's discretion.
More to the point, the majority noted that §2-306 is a gap filler and the
162 The trial court found, and both the majority and dissent agreed, that "[wihen the
parties negotiated the GPA in 1978 and 1979, and executed it on January 16, 1979, Buyer
needed and wanted to obtain under long term commitment or dedication as much gas as
possible, and the parties intended that the GPA not limit, for any reason, the volume of the
committed reserves or amount of gas to be delivered therefrom to Buyer by Seller(s) over
the 20-year term of the GPA." See Lenape, 925 S.W.2d 565, 580 (1996) (quoting from trial
court's decision).
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Lenape Res. Corp., 870 S.W.2d 286,293 n.4 (1993).
1 Lenape, 925 S.W.2d at 570. Comment 1 of the 1999 revised draft of the UCC repeats
the dubious claim that the "contested quantity term was not a requirements or output
contract." Had they simply said that explicit language defining the parameters of the
variable quantity was enough to avoid the Code's default rule, that would have made some
sense. Instead we end up with the notion that some variable quantity contracts are subject
to §2-306 and some are subject to another, apparently less restrictive, standard.
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contract language clearly filled the gap.1'6 The real question should have
been whether the clear language of the GPA could be trumped by the
imposition of a fact finder's notion of good faith.
It is illuminating to compare the differing views of what a good faith
test would entail. The majority catalogued the difficulties:
Instead of defining Tennessee's take-or-pay obligations in terms of a
fixed percentage of Sellers' delivery capacity, Tennessee would have
us read the GPA as requiring Tennessee to purchase only a portion
of gas that may be tendered as reasonably proportionate to any
normal or otherwise comparable prior output. The quantity of gas
which Tennessee must either take or pay for would depend on a
number of indeterminate variables: prior output; normal prior
output; comparable prior output; proportionality to either normal or
comparable prior output; and reasonableness of the proportionality.
Reading these factors into Tennessee's take-or-pay obligations, any
increase in production and delivery capacity would be measured
after the fact by these variables, thus injecting uncertainty into the
parties' obligations under the GPA.'66
According to the dissent, "The basic test for good faith here is whether
and to what extent the Sellers would have increased the quantity of gas
proffered had the contract price equaled the market price, i.e., was there
a valid business reason for the increased quantity independent of
price?", 67 That is, the seller enters into a long-term agreement giving it
complete flexibility to develop its business in response to all new
circumstances save the inability of the contract price to track market
conditions. It is hard to understand why that should be a mandatory
rule, especially because there are so many devices available for linking
the contract and market price.1 6 The dissent goes on to link the
"unreasonable disproportion" standard to the parties' expectations at the
time of contracting:
But whether the magnitude of the disproportion here is
unreasonable under section 2.306 depends on the expectations of the
"Regardless of whether the take-or-pay contract is an output contract, section 2.306
does not apply to this gas purchase agreement because the parties agreed to quantity
obligations that differ from those imposed by section 2.306. Section 2.306, like many other
provisions of Article 2 of the UCC, is a gap-filler and may be varied by the parties'
agreement." Lenape, 925 S.W.2d at 570. The 1999 Code revision did not mention this more
sensible piece of the decision.
" Id. at 571.
167 Id. at 582.
1" See Goldberg, supra note 39.
[Vol. 35:319
Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts
parties when the contract was executed and whether such an
increase in output could have been reasonably forecast or
anticipated. Orange and Rockland, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 822. Objective
indicia of the parties' reasonable expectations at that time may also
be considered, including the size and capabilities of the pipe lines
and other facilities, the history of the area, the nature of the
formation, local industry practices, reserve and deliverability
estimates and so forth. 9
The evidence on expectations and trade practice would be confined to
conditions in 1979 at the time of contract execution. There is no question
that when the contract was executed Tennessee was not concerned about
the possibility that Lenape would have too much delivery capacity.
Tennessee might not have anticipated an expansion of this magnitude,
but it surely hoped for one. It was scrambling for gas sources and the
more the merrier. Granting Lenape complete discretion in this
dimension seemed costless at the time. That turned out to be a big
mistake. But that mutual misjudgment should not empower the court to
rewrite the contract.
Tennessee compounded its mistake by failing to renegotiate limits on
Lenape's discretion in the six-year window before the suit by Lenape's
lessors forced it to expand its capacity. Lenape did not take full
advantage of its windfall for years and it would not have been very
expensive for Tennessee to buy its way out. It chose not to do so, and as
a result the price of a buyout rose dramatically. It is conceivable that had
the parties engineered a buyout, Lenape could still have been sued
successfully by its lessors for its failure to develop the leases. If so, it, not
Tennessee, would have been the big loser.
Lenape's relationship with its lessors was likely the proximate cause of
the huge expansion of delivery capacity. However, that should not
matter. Suppose that Lenape owned the properties outright. When the
gas market collapsed, the contract gave Lenape a valuable right. It could
threaten to develop a gas field for which it was assured above-market
prices. If the market conditions did not warrant the development, this
was at least a threat point in its dealings with Tennessee. Lenape's
taking a hard line might be less appealing than if it could say credibly
"the lessors made me do it." Still, there is no reason for the courts to take
sides in the renegotiation between two sophisticated hard-nosed
bargainers. Invocation of good faith would just tilt the subsequent
bargaining in Tennessee's favor.
" Lenape, 925 S.W.2d at 583.
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In Lenape, the seller of gas dramatically increased its output. Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc.,"7 presented an interesting twist.
Northern, a pipeline, had contracts to purchase natural gas from a
number of suppliers of natural gas and a contract to supply all of that
gas to Conoco. 171 However, after the deregulation of the gas market
Northern managed to buy itself out of all its contracts to buy gas so that
its gas purchases and sales dropped from 3 billion cubic feet per day in
the mid-1980s to zero in 1994. Hence, it had no gas under contract and,
therefore, had no obligation to deliver to Conoco. Conoco sued, arguing
that Northern could not avoid its obligation by canceling contracts with
its suppliers and a jury awarded it $20 million for lost processing profits.
That result was overturned, however, with the court finding that the
contract did not require that Northern buy any gas and, therefore, that it
had no obligation to deliver any gas to Conoco. Still, Conoco won half a
loaf, with a unanimous supreme court remanding on the question of
whether Northern's cancellation of its contracts was in good faith.
Nothing requires the seller in an output contract to have any output,
and nothing requires the buyer in a requirements contract to have
requirements. On the other hand, parties to output/requirements
contracts are required to exercise good faith in determining outputs
or requirements, as well as accept the concomitant risk that their
counterparts to the contract may make good faith variations, even to
the extent of liquidating or discontinuing the business.... We agree
with Conoco that a party who seeks to avoid performance of an
output contract by having no output - or of a requirements
contract by having no requirements - may not do so in bad faith.
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment remanding
this cause for a new trial for Conoco to attempt to prove that
Northern canceled its gas purchase contracts without a valid
business reason and in bad faith.
72
The Lenape majority's skepticism about defining a good faith response
to the dramatic changes in the natural gas market seems to have
evaporated in the three years between the two decisions. If Northern's
closing out its unprofitable contracts with suppliers was a valid business
reason for having no gas to deliver to Conoco, as the court held, what
could be bad faith? That, apparently, is a jury question, although there is
N. Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. 1999).
17 Northern was to deliver gas "in keeping with all the quantity and other provisions
of the various gas purchase contracts in effect from time to time." N. Natural Gas Co., 986
S.W.2d at 604-05.
" Id. at 608-09.
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no hint as to how a juror could possibly answer the question.
VI. PROPOSED OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON 2-306(1)
Were it up to me, courts would not be able to use good faith to trump
the allocation of discretion agreed to by the parties. I would simply
delete 2-306(1) from the Code. That is not about to happen. I am a bit
more optimistic about the feasibility of a revision of the Official
Comments which would establish safe harbors, protecting the parties
from the court's after-the-fact meddling. I propose the following
comments to 2-306(1):
1. Subsection (1) of this section, regarding output and requirements
contracts, applies the general approach of this Act, which requires
reading of commercial background and intent into the language of
any agreement. It requires good faith in the performance of that
agreement. However, it is recognized that the Official Comments
on the 1965 Code put forth an overly expansive definition of good
faith. The subsection applies to such contracts of nonproducing
establishments such as dealers or distributors, as well as to
manufacturing concerns.
2. In the past, contracts for output or requirements have been held
void because they lack mutuality of obligation. This Article's "good
faith" requirement has been employed to give the promise sufficient
content to make it enforceable. It is now recognized that the
invocation of good faith is not necessary for finding adequate
consideration in a requirements (or full output) contract. It is
sufficient that the promisor commits that if it has any requirements
(or output) that it must obtain it from (deliver it to) the
counterparty.
3. In long-term contracts, parties often give one party discretion to
determine quantity, for example, using requirements or full output
contracts. Because the counterparty will sometimes have made
investments in reliance on a particular range of output (or
purchases), the contract will often include constraints on the
discretion that convey the extent of that reliance. The Code's good
faith proviso should not be used to undo the decisions of the parties.
It should define default rules with clearly delineated safe harbors so
that the parties might fine-tune their balancing of flexibility and
reliance.
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4. The quantity-determining party's discretion is limited by zero on
the downside. If the parties did include any additional limitation on
the floor (for example, a take-or-pay obligation or a standby fee),
then that determines the buyer's good faith obligation. If the parties
did not include any additional obligation, then they can establish a
safe harbor by adopting explicit language (e.g., buyer does not
commit to having any requirements during the life of this
contract.) 73 Absent such language, good faith requires that the
downward discretion be limited by reasonableness. , The Official
Comments in the 1965 Code stated that the "essential test" of
reasonableness if a buyer discontinued purchases under a
requirements contract was good faith: "A shutdown by a
requirements buyer for a lack of orders might be permissible when a
shutdown to merely curtail losses would not." This distinction,
which makes no economic sense, is superceded under the current
Code.
5. The fear of unbounded liability has motivated much of the
commentary and case law regarding the need for good faith
limitations on discretion. Conceivably, the maximum could be
unbounded, although it is typically bounded by the capacity of a
particular entity (a mine, a plant, etc.). If no maximum is stated,
then good faith imposes a reasonableness limit on the quantity-
determining party's discretion. The contract is not illusory, as was
held in Oscar Schlegel Manufacturing Co. v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory,
231 N.Y. 459, 132 N.E. 148 (1921). Rather, the law imposes a
maximum (reasonableness) as was held in Moore v. American
Molasses Co. of New York, 106 Misc. 263, 174 N.Y.S. 440 (1919).
6. If a maximum is stated (either as a fixed quantity or as the
capacity of a particular entity), any quantity up to that limit satisfies
the requirement of good faith. Any estimated quantity term or
established usage level will have no effect on constraining the
promisor's discretion.
Alternatively,
6A. If a maximum is stated (either as a fixed quantity or as the
capacity of a particular entity), that quantity establishes the outer
In my consulting practice I have seen clauses like the following: "Parties recognize
that Buyer has no minimum volume obligation."
"r I would prefer a clearer default rule that sets the limit at zero, but I doubt that the
Code revisers would go that far.
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limits of the obligation. A stated estimate or a prior level of usage
indicates a good faith limitation on the promisor's discretion short
of the plant capacity only if there is no explicit limitation. The
parties can establish a safe harbor delimiting the boundaries of good
faith by explicit language (e.g., "the seller agrees that its obligation
is bounded by the capacity of buyer's furnace," or "if the buyer
requests more than 10,000 tons in a month, the seller can require
that the price for the excess be renegotiated").
CONCLUSION
One might object to the preceding discussion by invoking the
circularity problem. The backdrop against which these contracts were
written, either the common law or the Code, included "good faith." If
the parties drafted their agreements against that backdrop, then, it could
be argued, they have incorporated the present understanding of the law
into the contract. If the parties expected courts to apply the Code's good
faith standard, then a failure to do so would amount to a rewriting of the
agreement. Putting a "rational expectations" spin on things, when they
entered into the agreement, the parties could have anticipated what the
courts ultimately did. The implied limitation, the argument goes, was
part of the deal. Without a theoretical framework there is no particular
reason to prefer one interpretation to another. The theoretical
framework proposed here allows us to break the circle and to reject the
notion that the parties intended to incorporate the Code's good faith
standard.
The relevant theory is hardly esoteric. The core notion is that in long-
term agreements, adaptation to changed circumstances is often best
achieved by granting one party considerable discretion in determining
quantity. The discretion will not be unbounded; the contracts will
typically relate the quantity to a physical constraint, like the capacity of a
particular plant of the buyer or seller. Moreover, the contracts will often
go further than that. If the opposite party is vulnerable to quantity
variation, it will want to convey the contours of its reliance by, in effect,
confronting the decision maker with a price reflecting the extent of its
reliance.
In some instances, like the Great Lakes Carbon (GLC) petroleum coke
contracts,175 the contract allows the seller to operate the plant at any level
at all without taking into account any adverse effects on the
counterparty. This is not an accident, because GLC's ability to hold a
" See supra Section I.
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large inventory meant that its reliance costs would be very low.
Similarly, Propane International provided General Motors the flexibility
to put together a web of agreements to assure a low-cost supply of
standby gas, giving it an option to take gas at a price above the market
price at the time of contracting. 176 PI's reliance was nil. It agreed to stand
ready to deliver gas at the premium price (although that premium price
turned out to be well below the market price), and if General Motors did
not need the gas, PI would simply hold it in inventory. Likewise, Levy
relied on Feld to remove the day-old bread, but Feld, who apparently
was selling bread crumbs long before Levy bought his toaster oven, did
not need a promise that Levy would continue to produce bread crumbs;
Levy's self-interest (it had bought a toaster oven that appeared to have
no other economic use) provided sufficient protection of Feld's reliance.
The buyer's reliance in Wigand and Diamond Alkali was considerably
greater than in Levy, because the buyer owned capital assets the value of
which depended crucially on the continued operation of the plant. In
both instances, the buyer's protection was the penalty (lost revenue) that
the seller would incur from closing an otherwise viable facility - an
entire factory, rather than a mere toaster oven.
The other party's self-interest is not always enough. The preceding
discussion has provided numerous examples of devices that constrain
the exercise of discretion. For one, by incorporating flexible pricing, the
contracts could decrease the rewards to opportunistic behavior by the
quantity-determining party. Eastern's incentive to engage in fuel
freighting, for example, would normally have been constrained by tying
the contract price to current market conditions. However, the
breakdown of the price adjustment mechanism meant that in this
instance the constraint failed.'7 The meeting competition clause in the
Empire Gas contract is another example.178
Two-part pricing is another example. If the per unit price for small
quantities is high, then, so long as the buyer is likely to require an
amount above that minimum, the seller will have some assurance that it
will receive enough compensation to make its initial investment worth
while. This device was common in the petroleum coke contracts of the
aluminum companies. 179 General Motors also used two-part pricing with
176 See supra text accompanying note 42.
" The Laclede-Amoco contract also was indexed to the posted price; the opinion does
not indicate why Amoco was dissatisfied. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
17 Many of the petroleum coke contracts had indexed prices and maximum-minimum
prices, so that if the contract price were too far out of line, it would have to be renegotiated.
See Goldberg & Erickson, supra note 14, at 389, 394.
" See supra Section 1.
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Enterprise, its primary propane supplier.
Alternatively, the seller could be required to make a fixed payment.
Two-part pricing would mean that if the buyer's demand fell off
dramatically, the seller could .end up bearing all the risk. The seller
might insist upon more assurance so that even if the buyer took nothing,
the seller would still receive some compensation. There are numerous
devices for reaching this outcome: take-or-pay, minimum quantity,
standby charges, or liquidated damages (and variations on these) all set
the marginal price at zero for low quantities. The options considered in
the NIPSCO-CWI negotiations, as described above, indicate the range of
choices and the ability of serious commercial parties to tailor them to
their own needs. 8°
The tailoring need not always be wise, either ex ante or ex post. But
the important point is that the parties have an incentive to take their
reliance interest into account, and, because protecting reliance can be
costly, they have a further incentive to economize by not insisting upon
too much protection. There is no reason to believe that a court, using a
theoretically ungrounded good faith standard, could do better.
The contrast between NIPSCO's contract with CWI and Carbon County is another
indication of the ability of parties to tailor the contracts. See supra text accompanying notes
82-83.
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